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ABSTRACT 
In June 2015, California’s governor signed into law SB277, which removed the personal belief exemption to 
school immunization requirements, making medical exemptions the only valid way to send an unvaccinated child 
in the affected categories to school. Naturally, vaccine-hesitant parents opposed the legislation. After their efforts 
failed in the legislature, they turned to the courts, raising arguments old and new. To date, opponents have filed 
five lawsuits against the new California law, all of which have failed. This Article explains why courts in the 
United States, which have consistently upheld school immunization requirements, are correct to do so. These 
requirements are supported by strong policy reasons and serve a compelling interest, since they dramatically reduce 
the risk of outbreaks of potentially deadly diseases. These mandates fit with our basic principles of state police 
power, reasonable limits on individual rights, and protecting children. They are also supported by over a hundred 
years of jurisprudence. Using the opponents’ arguments to identify the strongest claims against SB277, the Article 
explains why those arguments—including claims based in the First Amendment, in parental rights, and in the 
right to education—cannot stand. 
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INTRODUCTION 
School immunization mandates have existed for over a century in the 
United States, and have been litigated ever since their creation.1  In each 
legislative session at least some states see bills introduced addressing these 
mandates.2  The predicted constitutionality of the proposed bills is debated 
during the legislative process, as are the arguments that courts address.  In 
April of 2017, one anti-vaccine organization published that they were tracking 
“173 Vaccine Bills in 40 States.”3  This Article explains why so far, no court, 
state or federal, in the United States has found state school immunization 
mandates unconstitutional.  This is true even when states have set limits on 
the scope of religious exemptions from the mandates.4  It demonstrates why 
upholding school immunization requirements is the right thing to do, both 
from a legal and policy perspective.  The Article uses the recent litigation 
surrounding the California law enacted in 2015, which removed the personal 
 
 1 For an early example of school immunization mandates litigation, see Abeel v. Clark, 24 P. 383 
(Cal. 1890). 
 2 Allison M. Buttenheim, The Vaccination-Exemption Challenge, GOVERNING (July 11, 2017), 
http://www.governing.com/gov-institute/voices/col-stronger-state-laws-vaccination-
immunization-exemption-school-entry.html. 
 3 Jefferey Jaxen, Activate: NVIC Now Monitoring 173 Vaccine Bills in 40 States, JEFFREYJAXEN.COM (Apr. 
25, 2017), http://www.jeffereyjaxen.com/news/activate-nvic-now-monitoring-173-vaccine-bills-
in-40-states. 
 4 Dorit R. Reiss, Thou Shalt Not Take the Name of the Lord Thy God in Vain: Use and Abuse of Religious 
Exemptions from School Immunization Requirements, 65 HASTINGS L.J. 1551, 1567–70 (2014). 
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belief exemption to school immunization requirements, to set out its 
argument.  The Article takes seriously the best arguments against mandates—
including new arguments, or old arguments in new forms—and explains why 
they cannot stand.  Politically, school immunization requirements may face 
heated battles.  In the reason-based world of the law, vaccine mandates 
correctly enjoy broad, strong support, because extensive evidence shows that 
the mandates are sound policy serving important goals of preventing 
outbreaks and protecting children and the community.  
School immunization requirements have been the focus of many court 
and legislative battles since at least the 19th century.  They are likely to remain 
contentious, because the stakes are high both for those who acknowledge the 
benefits of vaccines and are concerned about outbreaks, and for those who 
see vaccines as harmful and are afraid to vaccinate their children. 
Although none of the five lawsuits against SB277 had gone beyond trial 
level at this point,5 the validity of school immunization mandates is an 
important legal question expected to arise in other states as well.6  In addition 
to legal relevance, school immunization mandates affect the rate of 
immunization in the state, and stricter mandates are linked to higher rates of 
immunization and fewer outbreaks.7  Their constitutional validity therefore 
directly affects the health of communities and children.   
As this Article demonstrates, SB277 lawsuits were correctly rejected—
and courts should continue to reject such claims.  Basically, opponents of 
SB277 face two obstacles they have yet to overcome.  One is precedent: for 
over a century, our jurisprudence has solidly and consistently found school 
immunization mandates to be constitutional, with no requirement that states 
provide non-medical exemptions.  The other is the policy rationale 
supporting such strong constitutional jurisprudence: scientific studies 
demonstrate both that school immunization mandates reduce the risk of 
preventable diseases and that vaccines are safe and effective.  Mandates fit 
neatly into our basic principles, which allow reasonable public health 
regulation even when it interferes with individual rights.  
 
 5 Though two are under appeal.  
 6 During 2017, both Florida and Michigan have seen litigation on the issue. See Flynn v. Estevez, 221 
So. 3d 1241 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017) (concerning whether a diocesan school district may require 
all its students to be immunized, where Florida law allows parents to claim a religious exemption 
from immunization for their children); Nikolao v. Lyon, 238 F. Supp. 3d 964, 968 (E.D. Mich. 
2017) (describing a county health department’s alleged violation of the First Amendment in its 
treatment of a mother seeking to exempt her children from immunization). 
 7 W. David Bradford & Anne Mandich, Some State Vaccination Laws Contribute to Greater Exemption Rates 
and Disease Outbreaks in the United States, 34 HEALTH AFF. 1383, 1383 (2015). 
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The lawsuits against vaccine mandates are often (though not always) 
brought by people who believe, contrary to the strong empirical evidence, 
that vaccines are dangerous; they are reluctant to vaccinate their children for 
that reason.  As a result, litigants are fighting at a disadvantage.  They are 
arguing against both a policy that protects children specifically and the 
community generally, and against a legislative judgment on health issues 
supported by extensive evidence.  For these reasons, courts—correctly—
have consistently rejected opponents’ challenges to school mandates.8 
The focus of this Article is to provide a fair examination of the most 
plausible claims against school immunization mandates, put forth by people 
with a real passion and strong feelings about the topic.  The SB277 lawsuits, 
representing opponents’ best efforts, help achieve that goal. 
The Article proceeds as follows: Part I discusses vaccines, school 
immunization mandates, and the literature about both.  It demonstrates that 
strong evidence shows that vaccines are safe and effective and that school 
mandates work—and it shows the problem California faced as its 
immunization rates declined.  Part II discusses SB277 and its passage, setting 
out the trigger to the act—the Disneyland measles outbreak—the thorough 
deliberative process SB277 went through, and the broad support it enjoyed.  
Part III provides a short description of the lawsuits, addresses the 
reformulation of the facts by opponents, and then sets out the basic principles 
governing school mandates.  Part IV examines the efforts of opponents to 
challenge the validity of SB277, addressing the most plausible (but still not 
compelling) arguments first—covering right to education, religious freedom, 
and unconstitutional conditions.  It continues by examining arguments that 
are plausible, but have already been discussed and dismissed by multiple 
courts: parental freedom, equal protection, and substantive due process.  It 
ends with two very weak arguments, the claim that liability protections for 
vaccine manufacturers cannot coexist with mandates, and the claim that 
legislators passing SB277 engaged in racketeering activity.   
 
 8 That is not to say that there have been no legal victories for opponents of mandatory immunization. 
For example, opponents have succeeded in striking down attempts to limit religious exemptions to 
members of organized religions, Dalli v. Bd. of Educ., 267 N.E.2d 219, 222–23 (Mass. 1971), and 
in having statutes empowering officials to deny exemptions construed narrowly.  In re LePage, 18 
P.3d 1177, 1180 (Wyo. 2001); see also Reiss, supra note 4, at 1567–70.  But as the Article details, they 
have failed in getting immunization mandates struck down, or having a court declare that a non-
medical exemption is required.  
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I.  BACKGROUND: VACCINES AND SCHOOL MANDATES 
Vaccines are one of the great modern medical advances.9  In the United 
States alone, vaccines prevent tens of thousands of deaths and millions of 
hospitalizations each year.10  Worldwide, vaccines prevent millions of deaths 
each year, and could prevent more if broader coverage was achieved.11  Like 
all medical interventions, vaccines carry a risk of serious harm, but that risk is 
extremely low; serious harm from vaccines is very rare.12  To give one 
example, the very serious risk of a severe allergic reaction to vaccines—one 
that if left untreated can be fatal—is around one per million.13  Similarly, the 
risk of immune thrombocytopenic purpura (“ITP”), a blood platelet disorder, 
occurring after receipt of the Measles, Mumps and Rubella vaccine (“MMR”) 
is about 1 in 22,300 people, with most cases resolving within 6 months (note 
that the risk of ITP from measles infection is much higher).14  But as vaccines 
led to dramatic decreases in preventable diseases, some people have become 
more concerned about risks (real or imagined) of vaccines than their benefits.  
In words cited by the Supreme Court, vaccines are “victims of their own 
success.”15  For multiple reasons, past years have seen the rise of an anti-
vaccine movement16 that has had some legislative success.17  
High vaccination rates are important to prevent outbreaks.  If a high 
enough percentage of people is immune to a disease—whether through 
vaccination or through getting the disease—the chances of an outbreak 
decrease and may even completely disappear; this is the concept known as 
herd or community immunity.18  The idea is that if there are enough immune 
 
 9 Michael Worboys, Vaccines: Conquering Untreatable Diseases, 334 BMJ 19 (2007). 
 10 Cynthia G. Whitney et al., Benefits from Immunization During the Vaccines for Children Program Era— United 
States, 1994–2013, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION: MORBIDITY & MORTALITY 
WKLY. REP. (Apr. 25, 2014), https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/mm6316a4.htm. 
 11 Immunization Coverage Fact Sheet, WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION (July 16, 2018), 
http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs378/en/. 
 12 Margaret A. Maglione et al., Safety of Vaccines Used for Routine Immunization of US Children: A Systematic 
Review, 134 PEDIATRICS 325, 325 (2014). 
 13 Michael McNeil et al., Risk of Anaphylaxis after Vaccination in Children and Adults, 137 J. ALLERGY 
CLINICAL IMMUNOLOGY 868, 868 (2016).  
 14 Elizabeth Miller et al., Idiopathic Thrombocytopenic Purpura and MMR Vaccine, 84 ARCHIVE DISEASES 
CHILDHOOD 227, 228 (2001).  
 15 Bruesewitz v. Wyeth, 562 U.S. 223, 226 (2011). 
 16 PAUL A. OFFIT, DEADLY CHOICES: HOW THE ANTI-VACCINE MOVEMENT THREATENS US ALL 
2–11 (2011). 
 17 Denise F. Lillvis et al., Power and Persuasion in the Vaccine Debates: An Analysis of Political Efforts and 
Outcomes in the United States, 1998–2012, 92 MILBANK Q. 475, 495 (2014). 
 18 T. Jacob John & Reuben Samuel, Herd Immunity and Herd Effect: New Insights and Definitions, 16 EUR. 
J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 601, 602–03 (2000).  I also discuss this in Dorit Rubinstein Reiss, Herd Immunity 
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people, germs—even those introduced by non-immune travelers—are less 
likely to spread and reach the few people in the community who are not 
immune and are susceptible to infection.19  The corollary is that when 
vaccination rates drop, for example, because a congregation of people chose 
not to vaccinate, herd immunity is undermined, and the risk of outbreaks 
increases.20  
One of the best ways to increase immunization rates and achieve herd 
immunity is through implementation of school immunization requirements.  
While they have a long history, going back at least to the 19th century, these 
requirements became more commonplace in the second half of the 20th 
century.21  Today, all states and the District of Columbia have school 
immunization requirements, though states vary in the specific vaccines 
required and other details.  California, for example, requires that children be 
vaccinated against ten diseases before attending school: diphtheria, 
Haemophilus influenzae type b (“Hib”), measles, mumps, pertussis, polio, 
rubella, tetanus, hepatitis B, and varicella (“chickenpox”).22  All states, 
however, provide some type of exemptions from school immunization 
requirements.  Court battles tend to focus on exemptions.  All states allow 
medical exemptions, and most also recognize some type of non-medical 
exemption, such as religious or personal belief exemptions.23  States vary in 
the type of exemptions allowed and the ease of obtaining them.24  Studies 
consistently show that when exemptions are easier to obtain, higher 
exemption rates tend to occur.25  Studies also consistently show that higher 
 
and Immunization Policy: The Importance of Accuracy, 94 OR. L. REV. 1, 14–16 (2015). 
 19 Charlotte A. Moser & Paul A. Offit, News & Views: Herd Immunity and Vaccine Duration, CHILD. HOSP. 
PHILA. (Nov. 03, 2014), http://www.chop.edu/news/herd-immunity-and-vaccine-duration.  
 20 Paul Fine et al., “Herd Immunity”: A Rough Guide, 52 CLINICAL INFECTIOUS DISEASES 911, 914 
(2011) (“Social clustering among parents who decide not to vaccinate their children can result in 
groups of children in which vaccination levels are well below the herd immunity threshold. The 
same effect is found in religious communities that eschew vaccination . . . .”). 
 21 Dorit Rubinstein Reiss & Lois A. Weithorn, Responding to the Childhood Vaccination Crisis: Legal 
Frameworks and Tools in the Context of Parental Vaccine Refusal, 63 BUFFALO L. REV. 881, 892 (2015) 
(discussing the early adoption of inoculation practices by Massachusetts in 1855 and enactment of 
vaccinations requirements for schools through the 20th century). 
 22 Cal. Health & Safety Code § 120335 (West 2016). 
 23 Reiss & Weithorn, supra note 21, at 915.  
 24 Y. Tony Yang & Ross D. Silverman, Legislative Prescriptions for Controlling Nonmedical Vaccine Exemptions, 
313 [J]AMA 247, 247–48 (2015) (discussing non-medical exemptions ranging from exemptions for 
strictly medical issues to religious exemptions, and reviewing the difficulty in obtaining exemptions 
in different states). 
 25 Nina R. Blank et al., Exempting Schoolchildren from Immunizations: States with Few Barriers Had Highest 
Rates of Nonmedical Exemptions, 32 HEALTH AFF. 1282, 1289 (2013) (confirming the inverse 
relationship “between non-medical exemptions rates and the complexity of exemption applications 
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exemption rates lead to outbreaks of preventable diseases.26  
With this background, it is not surprising that declines in vaccination 
rates tend to lead states to try to tighten exemption laws.  For example, 
recently in Texas, the response to rising rates of exemptions was an 
introduction of (unsuccessful, as of yet) bills aimed at making it harder to get 
exemptions.27  Earlier, both Washington state and Oregon passed bills 
requiring parents seeking exemptions to fulfill an educational requirement 
before obtaining an exemption.28  
In 2010, California saw an outbreak of whooping cough that dwarfed 
previous outbreaks.  The outbreak exceeded 9,000 cases, 809 people were 
hospitalized, and ten infants younger than three months of age died from the 
disease.29  This was much, much higher than previous decades.30  Multiple 
studies found an association between locations of outbreaks and high 
 
procedures”); Jennifer S. Rota et al., Processes for Obtaining Nonmedical Exemptions to State Immunization 
Laws, 91 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH, 645, 645 (2001) (finding that less complex non-medical exemption 
application processes increase the number of parents claiming exemptions for children); Stephanie 
Stadlin et al., Medical Exemptions to School Immunization Requirements in the United States—Association of 
State Policies with Medical Exemption Rates (2004–2011), 206 J. INFECTIOUS DISEASES 989, 989 (2012) 
(finding that states with easier medical exemption methods had an increased number of 
exemptions); Yang & Silverman, supra note 24, at 248 (reviewing the range of exemptions nationally 
and recommending more stringent laws for obtaining non-medical exemptions). 
26 Daniel R. Feikin et al., Individual and Community Risks of Measles and Pertussis Associated with Personal 
Exemptions to Immunization, 284 [J]AMA 3145, 3145 (2000) (finding that the schools with higher 
numbers of measles and pertussis outbreaks had more vaccine exemptors);  Aamer Imdad et al., 
Religious Exemptions for Immunization and Risk of Pertussis in New York State, 2000–2011, 132  PEDIATRICS 
37, 40, 42 (2013) (finding that higher rates of pertussis occurred in areas with higher numbers of 
vaccine exemptions); Saad B. Omer et al., Geographic Clustering of Nonmedical Exemptions to School 
Immunization Requirements and Associations with Geographic Clustering of Pertussis, 168 AM. J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 
1389, 1394 (2008) (finding that “community-level risk[s] of outbreaks [are] also increased in the 
presence of geographic clusters of [vaccine] exemptors”); Saad B. Omer et al., Nonmedical Exemptions 
to School Immunization Requirements: Secular Trends and Association of State Policies with Pertussis Incidence, 296 
[J]AMA 1757, 1757 (2006) (finding that states allowing personal belief exemptions and easily 
granting them was associated with an increased incidence of pertussis); Jennifer L. Richards et al., 
Nonmedical Exemptions to Immunization Requirements in California: A 16-Year Longitudinal Analysis of Trends 
and Associated Community Factors, 31 VACCINE 3009, 3009 (2013) (confirming an increase in non-
medical exemptions in California from 1994 to 2009 and comparing data between geographic 
regions); Daniel A. Salmon et al., Health Consequences of Religious and Philosophical Exemptions from 
Immunization Laws, 281 [J]AMA 47, 47 (1999) (finding that increases in the number of vaccine 
exemptors caused an increased incidence of measles in non-exempt individuals).   
 27 Julie Chang, Bills Target High Rates of Texas Schoolchildren Lacking Vaccinations, MYSTATESMAN (Dec. 
07, 2016), https://www.statesman.com/NEWS/20170109/Bills-target-high-rates-of-Texas-
schoolchildren-lacking-vaccinations.  
 28 Lillvis et al., supra note 17, at 502.  
 29 Kathleen Winter et al., California Pertussis Epidemic, 2010, 161 J. PEDIATRICS 1091, 1091, 1093–94 (2012). 
 30 Jessica E. Atwell et al., Nonmedical Vaccine Exemptions and Pertussis in California, 2010, 132 
PEDIATRICS 624, 624 (2013); Omer et al. supra note 26, at 1389.  
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vaccination exemption rates, including the California outbreak mentioned 
earlier.31  These data strongly supported a link between the outbreak and 
California’s exemptions rates increasing dramatically over the previous 
decade.32 
In 2012, California passed AB2109.  The law required that parents 
seeking a personal belief exemption get a doctor’s signature on a portion of 
the exemption form stating that a healthcare provider informed parents 
about the risks and benefits of vaccines and the risks of the diseases they 
prevent.33  Governor Brown added a statement to the law requiring the 
California Health Department to add a separate religious exemption on the 
form.34  The bill came into effect in January 2014, and the following year 
exemption rates declined somewhat. 35  
And then, the Disneyland measles outbreak started.  
 
 
 
 
 31 See, e.g., Maimuna S. Majunder et al., Substandard Vaccination Compliance and the 2015 Outbreak, 169 
[J]AMA PEDIATRICS 494, 494 (2015); Atwell et al., supra note 30, at 627; Imdad et al., supra note 
26. 
 32 See Richards et al., supra note 26, at 3012 (confirming an increase in nonmedical exemptions to 
kindergarten vaccine requirements for California schools from 1994 through 2009, and 
highlighting the need for more stringent rules for obtaining such exemptions). 
 33 Assemb. B. 2109, 2011–12 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2012); Senate OKs Bill Targeting Unvaccinated Students, 
SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB. (Aug. 22, 2012, 5:12 PM), http://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/sdut-
senate-oks-bill-targeting-unvaccinated-students-2012aug22-story.html.  
 34 Signing Statement of Edmund G. Brown Jr., Office of the Governor, Assemb. B. 2109, 2011–12 
Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2012) (“I will direct the department to allow for a separate religious exemption 
on the form.  In this way, people whose religious beliefs preclude vaccinations will not be required 
to seek a health care practitioner’s signature.”).  However, Governor Brown may have unlawfully 
altered the law with the addition of a religious exemption form, which AB2109 did not stipulate.  
See Dorit R. Reiss, Viewpoint: Signing Statement on Vaccines Is Not Law, U.C. HASTINGS RECORDER 
(Oct. 9, 2013), https://www.law.com/therecorder/almID/1202622728667/viewpoint-signing-
statement-on-vaccines-is-not-law/ (arguing that the governor’s signing statement went beyond the 
law and was ultra vires).  This theory  has not been tested in court.  
 35 CAL. DEP’T HEALTH, IMMUNIZATION BRACH, 2014–2015 KINDERGARTEN IMMUNIZATION 
ASSESSMENT RESULTS 1 (2015), 
https://www.cdph.ca.gov/Programs/CID/DCDC/CDPH%20Document%20Library/Immuniz
ation/2017-2018KindergartenSummaryReport.pdf. 
 
 
Oct. 2018] LITIGATING ALTERNATIVE FACTS 215 
   
 
II.  SB277 AND ITS PASSAGE 
A.  The Measles Outbreak  
In early 2015, California experienced what turned out to be a large 
outbreak of measles, which eventually spanned seventeen states, Mexico, and 
Canada.36  The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (“CDC”) 
described the outbreak as follows: 
On January 5, 2015, the California Department of Public Health (CDPH) 
was notified about a suspected measles case.  The patient was a hospitalized, 
unvaccinated child, aged 11 years with rash onset on December 28.  The 
only notable travel history during the exposure period was a visit to one of 
two adjacent Disney theme parks located in Orange County, California.  On 
the same day, CDPH received reports of four additional suspected measles 
cases in California residents and two in Utah residents, all of whom reported 
visiting one or both Disney theme parks during December 17–20.  By 
January 7, seven California measles cases had been confirmed, and CDPH 
issued a press release and an Epidemic Information Exchange (Epi-X) 
notification to other states regarding this outbreak.37  
News outlets blamed the outbreak on anti-vaccine activism, with news 
articles declaring that “[t]his looks like another artifact of the rise of the anti-
vaccination movement.”38  Headlines included “Disneyland: The Latest 
Victim of the Anti-Vaxxers”39 and “Disneyland measles outbreak sheds light 
on anti-vaccine movement.”40  Concern was high in California as cases 
increased.  A study published in March pointed out that “substandard 
vaccination compliance is likely to blame for the 2015 measles outbreak. Our 
study estimates that MMR vaccination rates among the exposed population 
in which secondary cases have occurred might be as low as 50% and likely 
 
 36 Measles—The Americas, WORLD HEALTH ORG. (Feb. 13, 2015), http://www.who.int/csr/don/13-
february-2015-measles/en/.  The outbreak made California an exporter not just of computers, 
electronic commodities, and other goods, but of measles.  Trade Statistics, CALCHAMBER 
ADVOCACY (2017), https://advocacy.calchamber.com/international/trade/trade-statistics/.  
 37 Jennifer Zipprich et al., Measles Outbreak—California, December 2014–February 2015, CTRS. FOR 
DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION: MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. (Feb. 20, 2015), 
https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/mm6406a5.htm?s_cid=mm6406a5_w. 
 38 Michael Hiltzik, Anti-Vaccination Update: How the Measles Crisis Struck Disneyland, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 8, 
2015, 9:26 AM), http://www.latimes.com/business/hiltzik/la-fi-mh-antivaccination-update-the-
measles-crisis-strikes-disneyland-20150108-column.html. 
 39 Jeffrey Kluger, Disneyland: The Latest Victim of the Anti-Vaxxers, TIME, 
http://time.com/3664553/disneyland-measles-antivaxxers/ (last updated Jan. 23, 2015). 
 40 Marisa Taylor, Disneyland Measles Outbreak Sheds Light on Anti-Vaccine Movement, AL JAZEERA AMERICA 
(Jan. 23, 2015, 12:14 PM), http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2015/1/23/measles-
disneyland-anti-vaccine.html. 
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no higher than 86%.”41 
The emphasis on non-vaccination as a cause of the outbreak drew 
attention to the problem of the high exemption rates in some California 
communities.  While the emphasis in the media was on the Disneyland 
outbreak, this was the second year in a row that California saw relatively high 
rates of measles.  Although the largest outbreak in 2014 was not in California, 
but in an Amish community with low immunization rates in Ohio,42 
California’s 2014 outbreak led to the highest number of cases in the state 
since 1995.43  In this relatively large measles outbreak 22 out of more than 
60 cases occurred in Orange County (where Disneyland is located), an area 
that therefore saw two unusually large outbreaks of measles in two 
consecutive years.44  
B.  Legislative Result  
While some of the lawsuits tried to present SB277 as the result of 
pharmaceutical companies’ influence alone, the broad support behind it, and 
the events leading to it, do not support such an interpretation.  This was not 
a law that was created by one person, nor was it passed without going 
through the normal legislative process.  
After calls from constituents, a coalition of legislators which included 
Senator and pediatrician Richard Pan, Senator Ben Allen, and 
Assemblywoman Lorena Gonzales, formed to put the legislation together.45  
They were supported by a group of parent activists with different 
backgrounds who formed an organization called Vaccinate California that 
co-sponsored the bill.46  The proposed SB277 went through three legislative 
committees in the California Senate—the Senate’s Health Committee, 
Education Committee, and Judiciary Committee—before heading to the 
 
 41 Majumder et al., supra note 31 at 494. 
 42 Paul A. Gastañaduy et al., A Measles Outbreak in an Underimmunized Amish Community in Ohio, 375 NEW 
ENG. J. MED. 1344, 1344 (2016). 
 43 Zipprich et al., Notes from the Field: Measles Outbreak—California, January 1–April 18, 2014, CTRS. FOR 
DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION: MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. (Apr. 25, 2014), 
https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/mm6316a6.htm. 
 44 Eryn Brown, CDC: 2014 A Record Year for Measles, California Has 60 Cases, L.A. TIMES (May 29, 2014, 
6:16 PM), http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-measles-california-cdc-20140529-
story.html. 
 45 Jeremy B. White, From Death Threats to Holocaust Warning, California Vaccine Bill an Extraordinary Fight, 
SACRAMENTO BEE (June 30, 2015, 5:01 PM), https://www.sacbee.com/news/politics-
government/capitol-alert/article25909216.html (last updated June 30, 2015, 11:01 PM). 
 46 Hannah Henry, And Then Immunity Won the Day, MOTHERTHINK (July 3, 2015), 
http://www.motherthink.com/2015/07/03/and-then-immunity-won-the-day/. 
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floor for a vote.47  It passed the Senate, went through the Assembly’s Health 
Committee, passed the Assembly, and was signed by California’s 
Governor—going through a full deliberative process.48  
In each Committee hearing, both sides presented testimony,49 and in 
each hearing, several hundreds of people opposed to at least some vaccines 
filled the meeting chamber, many of them families with children in tow, 
attending to oppose the legislation.50  While opposition was intense, it is 
important to remember opponents represent a very small, if vocal, minority 
in California.51  On the other side, the bill was co-sponsored by the parents’ 
organization, Vaccinate California, which coordinated letters of support 
from all California’s counties, spoke up for the bill in different forums, and 
supported the bill on social media.52  It also received written support from 
the California Parents-Teachers Association53 and several school boards.54.  
Opponents had multiple chances to present their objections and convince 
legislators, and made full use of them, with phone calls, letters, and extensive 
social media advocacy.  Most legislators, however, ended up supporting the 
law, which passed with large majorities.  The final vote was 24 supporting to 
14 opposing in the Senate, with two not voting, and 46 to 31 in the Assembly, 
 
 47 Vote Totals, S.B. 277, 2014–15 S., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2015), 
https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billVotesClient.xhtml?bill_id=201520160SB277. 
 48 Id.  
 49 For full disclosure, I was one of the witnesses testifying before the Judiciary Committee.  Notes from 
my testimony are on file with Author, to be shared on request.   
 50 Tracy Seipel, Vaccine Exemptions: California SB277 Against Opt-Outs Advances in 6-2 Senate Health 
Committee, MERCURY NEWS (Apr. 8, 2015, 7:51 AM), http://www.mercurynews.com/2015/04/ 
08/vaccine-exemptions-california-sb277-against-opt-outs-advances-in-6-2-senate-health-
committee-vote/ (last updated Aug. 12, 2016, 4:47 AM). 
 51  Robin Abcarian, California Vaccine Law Opponents: Passionate, Persistent, and Science-averse, L.A. TIMES 
(June 29, 2015, 4:17 PM) http://www.latimes.com/local/abcarian/la-me-ra-vaccine-opponents-
persistent-20150629-column.html; Jennifer Medina, California Set to Mandate Childhooe Vaccines Amid 
Intense Fight, N.Y. TIMES (June 25, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/26/us/california-
vaccines-religious-and-personal-exemptions.html.  
 52 SB277 Becomes Law, VACCINATECALIFORNIA BLOG (July 1, 2015), http://vaccinatecalifornia.org/ 
2015/07/01/sb277-becomes-law/. 
 53 Health Care and Immunizations, CALIFORNIA STATE PTA, http://capta.org/focus-areas/health-
safety/health-care-and-immunizations/. 
 54 See, e.g., Noel Brinkerhoff, School Board Approves New Immunization Policy, NAPA VALLEY REG. (Feb. 5, 
2016), http://napavalleyregister.com/news/local/school-board-approves-new-immunization-
policy/Article_ba454325-0ac4-5b2c-b240-007a95d6e631.html (illustrating an example of a school 
board demonstrating support for vaccination requirements); see also Briefs: Piedmont School Board 
Supports State’s Vaccination Bill, MERCURY NEWS (June 17, 2015, 11:22 AM), 
http://www.mercurynews.com/2015/06/17/briefs-piedmont-school-board-supports-states-
vaccination-bill (illustrating an additional example of a school board demonstrating support for 
vaccination requirements). 
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with three not voting.55   Governor Jerry Brown signed the bill the day after 
the assembly vote,56 with a strong signing statement that said, among other 
things: 
The science is clear that vaccines dramatically protect children against a 
number of infectious and dangerous diseases. While it’s true that no medical 
intervention is without risk, the evidence shows that immunization 
powerfully benefits and protects the community.57 
Opponents were not willing to give up.  They mobilized to place the issue 
directly before California’s voters by putting a referendum about it on the 
ballot.  However, they failed to gather the required number of signatures to 
put it on the ballot (five percent of the votes cast for the Governor at the last 
election),58 falling far below the minimum required.59  They tried to recall 
the lead author of the bill, pediatrician and Senator Richard Pan, but they 
failed to submit any signatures supporting their recall effort.60  
They also turned to the courts, asking courts to overturn the law.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 55 Vote Totals, S.B. 277, 2014–15 S., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2015), https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/ 
faces/billVotesClient.xhtml?bill_id=201520160SB277. 
 56 Tracy Seipel & Jessica Calefati, California Vaccine Bill SB 277 Signed into Law by Jerry Brown, MERCURY 
NEWS, http://www.mercurynews.com/2015/06/30/california-vaccine-bill-sb-277-signed-into-
law-by-jerry-brown/ (last updated Aug. 12, 2016, 1:53 AM). 
 57 Signing Statement of Edmund G. Brown Jr., Office of the Governor, Assemb. B. 2109, 2011–12 
Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2012). 
 58 Alex Padilla, Referendum, CALIFORNIA SECRETARY OF STATE (2018), 
http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/ballot-measures/referendum/.  
 59 Jeremy B. White, California Vaccine Referendum Falls Short in Internal Count, SACRAMENTO BEE (Sept. 
30, 2015, 8:08 PM), http://www.sacbee.com/news/politics-government/capitol-
alert/Article37144386.html (last updated Oct. 1, 2015, 8:38 AM). 
 60 Jeremy B. White, Richard Pan Recall Effort Falls Short on Vaccine Issue, SACRAMENTO BEE (Jan. 4, 2016, 
9:25 AM), http://www.sacbee.com/news/politics-government/capitol-alert/Article52931130.html 
(last updated Feb. 2016, 4:28 PM).  This is notably not a mistake; they submitted “[n]ot a single 
signature.”  Id. 
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III.  LEGAL CHALLENGES TO SB277 
August 2016 was a tense month in California’s vaccine wars.  The first 
case against the new immunization law, SB277, was filed with a federal judge 
in San Diego.   On August 12, 2016, I attended a hearing conducted by Judge 
Dana M. Sabraw to decide whether to grant a preliminary injunction in a 
suit filed by seventeen different plaintiffs and four organizations against the 
new law.61  The law removed California’s Personal Belief Exemption from 
school immunization requirements.62  The plaintiffs, all unwilling to fully 
vaccinate their children against the ten diseases the law required they be 
protected from before attending school, believed they had no choice but to 
keep their children out of school in the wake of the law.  The stakes, from 
their point of view, were very high.  Their supporters—mostly anti-vaccine 
activists, including people from out-of-state—also saw the stakes as high, 
concerned about the precedent SB277 could set for other states if not struck 
down.  A long line of opponents of the act attended the hearing; to my 
knowledge, I was the only person there not in opposition to SB277, aside 
from the state attorneys.  I had at that point been advocating for vaccines for 
over four years and was involved in supporting the law during the legislative 
process, including testifying before the judiciary committee on the legal 
aspects of school immunization mandates, explaining why the proposed law 
was constitutional under existing jurisprudence.  
The Judge asked a lot of questions during the hearing, but his demeanor 
let neither party know where he stood.  We all had to wait for two weeks for 
the decision.  Until 2016, no court—state or federal—had struck down a 
school immunization mandate, and a long line of cases upheld them.  But 
the plaintiffs’ lawyers worked hard to convince the judge that California’s 
SB277 should be struck down, that this time a state went too far in requiring 
immunizations for school, that the requirement was too stringent.  However, 
their efforts were unsuccessful.  Judge Sabraw’s decision to reject their 
request for a preliminary injunction made it clear he thought their chances 
of success on the merits were low, and they decided to withdraw the lawsuit.63  
 
 61 For details on the questions asked and the arguments made at the hearing, see Transcript of Motion 
Hearing, Whitlow v. California, 203 F. Supp. 3d 1079 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 12, 2016) (No. 3:16-cv-01715). 
 62 The law amended California’s Public Health and Safety code to repeal section 120365, which 
allowed parents to exempt their children from the school immunization requirements if those 
conflicted with their personal beliefs.  S.B. 277, 2014–15 S., Reg. Sess. § 4 (Cal. 2015).  
 63 Notice of Voluntary Dismissal Without Prejudice at 1, Whitlow v. California, 203 F. Supp. 3d 1079 
(S.D. Cal. Aug. 31, 2016) (No. 3:16-cv-01715); see also Dennis F. Hernandez, Health First, L.A 
LAWYER, June 2018, at 31 (noting  the willingness of the court in Whitlow to limit an individual’s 
right to practice religion freely when that individual right endangers the health of the community).  
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This lawsuit was the first of several lawsuits attacking SB277. So far, five 
lawsuits have been filed against SB277 (One is a lawsuit initially filed in 
federal court, rejected, and refiled in state court by the same group).64  Three 
of them were professionally written, thoughtfully (if not very convincingly, as 
explained) argued.65  One, filed by a lawyer, did not clearly make its claims 
and ended with the demurrer against it sustained, and a strong court of 
appeals decision against it.66  The last lawsuit was filed by a number of pro-
se litigants, and its arguments were the least plausible.67  All five have been 
rejected by the trial courts.  Two were appealed; for one, a panel of the Court 
of Appeal for the Second Appellate District soundly rejected the appeal, and 
the other is still open.68  The rejection in each case drew, in part, on Judge 
Sabraw’s initial, carefully reasoned decision to reject the motion for 
preliminary injunction.  
This Article assumes that these lawsuits represent the best efforts of 
SB277 opponents.  I will use them to overcome my natural bias, as a 
supporter of the legislation.  As Part I sets out, school immunization 
mandates draw on extensive data that shows that vaccines are safe (their risks 
are small, and the risks of not vaccinating are much greater), that high rates 
of vaccination reduce outbreaks, and thus strong school mandates increase 
rates of vaccination and reduce outbreaks. These facts led courts in the 
United States to largely uphold states’ choices in relation to school 
 
 64 Table 1, in Appendix, describes the lawsuit in more detail, including the lawyers (to highlight that 
one had unrepresented plaintiffs).  
 65 See generally Complaint for Declaratory & Injunctive Relief, Whitlow v. California, 203 F. Supp. 3d 
1079 (S.D. Cal. July 1, 2016) (No. 3:16-cv-01715); Complaint for Declaratory, Injunctive, or Other 
Relief, Torrey Love v. Cal. Dep’t of Educ., No. SCV0039311 (Cal. Super. Ct. Apr. 4, 2017) 
[hereinafter Torrey Love Complaint].  Torrey Love is actually two lawsuits, one filed in federal court and 
the other in state court, hence there were three professionally written complaints.  The state version of 
Torrey Love is currently under appeal in the California Court of Appeal.  Torrey Love, No. SCV0039311 
(Cal. Super Ct. Nov. 2, 2017), appeal docketed, No. C086030 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 15, 2017). 
 66 See Order of Dismissal, Buck v. California, No. BC617766 (Cal. Super. Ct. Feb. 3, 2017).  In 
October 2017, during the appeal, two of the plaintiffs, including Tamara Buck, the initial lead, 
withdrew from the lawsuit.  It then became Brown v. Smith on appeal.  See Brown v. Smith, 24 Cal. 
App. 5th 1135, 1143 (Cal. Ct. App. 2018).  However, since the initial court decision rejecting the 
lawsuit was still Buck, and since the lawsuit drew heavily (and wrongly) on Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 
U.S. 483 (1954), I will continue to refer to it as Buck for the purpose of this Article in order to avoid 
confusion.  Buck was the first lawsuit, filed in April 2016, but because its arguments are relatively 
weak it will get less emphasis in this Article. 
 67 Report & Recommendation of U.S. Magistrate Judge, Middleton v. Pan, 2017 WL 7053936 (C.D. 
Cal. Dec. 15, 2016) (No. 2:16-cv-05224-SVW-AGR).  The district judge adopted the magistrate 
judge’s recommendation to dismiss the lawsuit.  See Middleton v. Pan, No. 2:16-cv-05224-SVW-AGR, 
2018 WL 582324 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 25, 2018), appeal dismissed, No. 18-55268 (9th Cir. June 27, 2018). 
 68  See Brown v. Smith, 24 Cal. App. 5th 1135 (Cal. Ct. App. 2018).   
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mandates.69  Opponents had to challenge both the factual basis behind the 
mandates and the existing jurisprudence.  Because the bulk of the Article 
focuses on the legal arguments raised to challenge the jurisprudence, this 
section—seeking to present the basic principles and framework within which 
the lawsuits had to operate—starts with opponents’ efforts to challenge the 
factual premises behind SB277, before continuing with the longstanding 
jurisprudence upholding immunization mandates and the basic principles 
behind them.  Part IV, then, deals with opponents’ legal arguments for 
moving away from this jurisprudence.  
A.  Reframing the Facts 
One of the reasons legislatures pass mandates and courts uphold them is 
that abundant evidence supports the claim that such mandates prevent 
diseases, and, in doing so,  protect children and the community.70  One way 
to fight against mandates is to try and challenge that evidence.  SB277 
opponents challenged the descriptions I provided above in three major ways 
(not necessarily in the order I present them).  First, they challenged tightening 
school mandates in California as unnecessary, by claiming that at 
California’s rate of exemptions, unvaccinated children do not pose a risk to 
other children. Second, they challenged the role of the measles outbreak in 
triggering SB277, claiming there was no public health emergency justifying 
the bill even in relation to vaccination against measles, and certainly in 
relation to the other vaccines cover by California’s immunization mandate.  
Finally, they claimed that vaccines were neither safe nor necessary, 
challenging the science on vaccines.  
These claims are repeated across the lawsuits, and this Article will only 
provide the strongest examples for each. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 69 State jurisprudence serves as an exception, setting limits on the ways states enforce religious 
exemptions to school mandates.  See Reiss, supra note 4, at 1558–70 (discussing religious exemptions 
to school mandates in practice by the states). 
 70 See infra Part I.  
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1.  School Mandates and Necessity 
In Whitlow v. California, the plaintiffs claimed that the number of children 
with non-medical exemptions in California prior to the law was too low to 
affect public health, and that treating unvaccinated children as disease 
carriers is unfair and unjustified. The lawsuit stated that: 
California  did not have “escalating numbers of unvaccinated children” 
when SB 277 was introduced.  As CDPH reports show, prior to SB 277’s 
introduction and enactment, kindergarten PBE [personal belief exemption] 
rates had dropped 19%, from an already low 3.15% in 2013–14 to 2.54% 
in 2014–15.  Rates fell another 7% in 2015–16, to 2.38%.  In fact, at SB 
277’s introduction, California’s  vaccination rate was “at or near all-time 
high levels.”   
Defendants characterize Plaintiffs’ children—all of whom are selectively 
vaccinated, none of whom carry any illnesses, and some of whom have 
laboratory-confirmed immunity—as “unvaccinated” carriers of “potentially 
fatal diseases.”  Defendants do not explain how Plaintiffs’ healthy children 
are a “danger to public health” or how their exclusion from school “protects 
the public.”71  
This description understates the issue on two fronts.  First, it ignores the 
trend of rising exemptions.  Between 1996 and 2010, California’s exemption 
rate increased 380%, from 0.5% to 2.3%.72  While the total number of 
exemptions in the state never rose above three percent, the exemption rate 
was not evenly distributed: some areas and some schools had much higher 
rates of PBEs than others, making them potential hot spots for outbreaks.73  
Second, the complaint understates the risk from unvaccinated children, 
individually and in aggregate.  Unvaccinated children are at higher risk of 
getting a preventable disease, and at higher risk of transmitting it.74  Several 
outbreaks in the United States were directly traced to an unvaccinated child 
 
 71 Plaintiffs’ Reply to State Defendant Opposition to Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 3–4, 
Whitlow v. California, 203 F. Supp. 3d 1079 (S.D. Cal. 2016) (No. 3:16-cv-01715-DMS-BGS) 
(internal citations omitted). 
 72 See Malia Jones & Alison Buttenheim, Potential Effects of California’s New Vaccine Exemption Law on the 
Prevalence and Clustering of Exemptions, 104(9) AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 3 (2014) (discussing California 
exemption rates and the effect of policy change on vaccine refusal trends). 
 73 See Elaine Won, Protecting Our Children: The California Public School Vaccination Mandate Debate, 10 CAL. 
LEGAL HIST.  471, 477–79 (2015) (discussing studies that report higher exemption rates among 
wealthier populations in California).  
 74 See, e.g., Feikin et al., supra note 26, at 3145 (finding that vaccine “[e]xemptors were 22.2 times . . . 
more likely to acquire measles and 5.9 times . . . more likely to acquire pertussis than vaccinated 
children”); Jason M. Glanz et al., Parental Refusal of Pertussis Vaccination is Associated with an Increased 
Risk of Pertussis Infection in Children, 123 PEDIATRICS 1446, 1447, 1449 (2009) (detailing studies 
demonstrating increased risks of contracting infectious diseases for unvaccinated children). 
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coming back from abroad with a preventable disease.75  When unvaccinated 
children congregate, another risk arises, the risk of undermining herd 
immunity.   High rates of exemptions mean rates of vaccination have gone 
down—and it is therefore unsurprising that studies repeatedly found that 
areas with high rates of exemptions were more vulnerable to outbreaks.76  So 
the simple reality is that unvaccinated children create a risk of disease to 
others, a risk much higher than the one created by their vaccinated, 
protected peers, and when they congregate—for example, when a 
community leans towards non-vaccination—there is a larger risk of disease.  
That was exactly the situation in California before the outbreak, where 
although the overall rate of immunization was high, some counties had very 
low rates, and it contributed to the Disneyland outbreak.77  
2.  The Measles Outbreak as an Impetus to SB277 
Several lawsuits claimed that the measles outbreak did not justify the 
passage of SB277.  For example, the plaintiff’s in Whitlow stated that:  
What the State ignores is that both outbreaks began with foreign-imported 
measles and ended with relatively few people affected.  Despite originating 
from a foreign visitor in one of the most populous places  in the state, where 
more than 60,000 people were potentially exposed, the Disneyland outbreak 
affected a total of 136 Californians and was quickly contained.  Defendants 
present no evidence that Disneyland, or any outbreak, would have been any 
different  if children with PBEs had been permanently barred from school.  
Moreover, if anything, the Disneyland outbreak shows that even when many 
thousands are  exposed to measles, very few become infected, belying Dr. 
Schechter’s speculation that California is on the verge of a pandemic so 
imminent that draconian actions, like repealing PBEs or permanently 
 
 75 See David E. Sugerman et al., Measles Outbreak in a Highly Vaccinated Population, San Diego, 2008: Role 
of the Intentionally Undervaccinated, 125 PEDIATRICS 747, 747 (2010) (investigating the large outbreak 
of measles in San Diego, California following the return of an unvaccinated, infected child traveling 
from Switzerland).  See generally Amy A. Parker et al., Implications of a 2005 Measles Outbreak in Indiana 
for Sustained Elimination of Measles in the United States, 355 NEW ENG. J. MED. 447 (2006); Maggie Fox, 
Measles Outbreak in Minnesota Caused by Vaccine Skeptics, NBC (May 8, 2017, 12:43 PM), 
https://www.nbcnews.com/health/health-news/measles-outbreak-minnesota-caused-vaccine-
skeptics-n756246 (last updated May 9, 2017, 3:13 PM) (detailing measles outbreaks in Indiana and 
Minnesota during 2005 and 2017, respectively).  
 76 Feikin et al., supra note 26, at 3145; see also Aamer Imdad et al., Religious Exemptions for Immunization 
and Risk of Pertussis in New York State, 2000–2011, 132 PEDIATRICS 37, 40, 42 (2013) (indicating a 
positive correlation between areas of high exemption rates and prevalence of pertussis in the state 
of New York); Omer supra note 30,  at 1394 (discussing evidence for an increased risk of vaccine-
preventable diseases in areas with geographic “clusters” of exemptors). 
 77 See Majumder et al., supra note 31, at 494 (indicating substandard vaccination compliance was likely 
to blame for the 2015 outbreak of measles at Disneyland Resort).  
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isolating healthy schoolchildren is necessary.78   
While the Disneyland outbreak was relatively limited, this claim ignores two 
things.  While compared to the population of California, the outbreak was 
limited in scope (not surprising, when most people are vaccinated), it was the 
largest outbreak in the state since the 1990s, dramatically higher than what 
should happen when vaccination rates are high enough, and it was 
concentrated in areas with low rates of vaccination.  Second, the outbreak 
was quickly contained through extensive work by the California Health 
Department, work that was costly and time-consuming: the costs were in the 
millions. 79  Further, the response to the outbreak involved quarantining tens 
of people.80  In other words, though outbreaks caused by non-vaccination 
can be contained, containment efforts at best cost money that the state 
cannot spend on other important health issues, and at worst, fail to prevent 
deaths and harms. 81  Containment also involves limiting the liberty of people 
exposed to the disease.  At worst the measles outbreak would cost lives and 
permanent disabilities.82  
 
 78 Plaintiffs’ Reply to State Defendant Opposition to Motion for Preliminary Injunction, supra note 
71, at 6. 
 79 Kathleen Harriman, 2014–2015 Measles Outbreak: It’s a Small World After All, CAL. DEP’T PUB. 
HEALTH (June 9, 2015), https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/nvpo/nvac/meetings/ 
pastmeetings/2015/2014-2015_california_measles_outbreak.pdf (referencing the $1.56–$3.91 
million in estimated public health cost in California from this outbreak).  That kind of cost is not 
unusual for measles outbreaks.  See generally Tara Haelle, Measles Outbreaks in Dollars and Cents: It Costs 
Taxpayers Bigtime, FORBES (Feb. 11, 2015, 7:01 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/tarahaelle/ 
2015/02/11/measles-outbreak-in-dollars-and-cents-it-costs-taxpayers-bigtime/#1dcd12fb3f63 
(discussing the expensive economic costs that follow measles outbreaks).  
 80 To give a few examples, fourteen infants in a daycare in Santa Monica were quarantined during 
the outbreak.  Brittny Mejia & Matt Hamilton, Measles: State Totals Rise by One Case, But No Slowdown 
in the Outbreak, L.A. Times (February 2, 2015, 9:01 PM), http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-
me-ln-santa-monica-baby-measles-20150202-story.html.  Unvaccinated high school students were 
kept home.  Rebecca Plevin & Adrian Florido, Disneyland Measles Tally Rises, Unvaccinated OC 
Highschool Students Kept Home, SCPR (Jan. 16, 2015), https://www.scpr.org/news/2015/01/ 
16/49326/amid-measles-outbreak-oc-high-school-makes-unvacci/.  
 81 See generally Charlotte A. Moser et al., Funding the Costs of Disease Outbreaks Caused by Non--Vaccination, 
J. LAW, MED. & ETHICS 633–36, 643, 647 (2015) (discussing the costs the government must pay in 
response to vaccine-preventable disease outbreaks). 
 82 Europe, where low vaccination rates led to high rates of measles in the past few years, has seen tens 
of deaths, including in France, Italy, and Portugal, and thousands of hospitalizations.  Measles Cases 
Hit Record High in the European Region, WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION (Aug. 20, 2018), 
http://www.euro.who.int/en/media-centre/sections/press-releases/2018/measles-cases-hit-
record-high-in-the-european-region.  In the first six months of 2018 Europe saw 41,000 measles 
cases and thirty-seven people died.  To take Italy as an example, in 2017 over forty percent of 
patients were hospitalized.  Measles in Italy: Weekly Bulleting, EPICENTRO  (Nov. 4 2017), 
http://www.epicentro.iss.it/problemi/morbillo/bollettino/Measles_WeeklyReport_N33eng.pdf  
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3.  Vaccines Risks and Benefits  
At least three of the cases tried to challenge the scientific consensus that 
vaccines risks are small and their benefits large, with different degrees of 
competence.  These make a large part of the lawsuits, and I will only address 
some of these claims.  The plaintiffs in Torrey-Love, for example, asserted that 
the vaccines required are not necessary, making some incorrect assertions,83 
like the claim that Hepatitis B is almost always sexually transmitted,84 or the 
claim that tetanus (a disease with ten percent mortality and almost always a 
long, painful recovery)85 is “very rarely” dangerous to the individual.86  The 
complaint generally downplayed the risk from vaccine-preventable diseases.  
More extremely, the plaintiffs in Buck v. Smith claimed that vaccines do 
not provide immunity, that their immunity is short-lived (“only a few weeks 
(if at all)”),87 and that there are real alternatives to mandates: parents may 
use “non-allopathic” means of immunity (the complaint does not specify 
what those would be),88 or the state may quarantine the sick.  The complaint 
argues that: 
Natural immunity comes with no risk of harmful side effect; by contrast, all 
vaccines come with dozens of harmful side-effects, e.g. asthma, allergies, 
autism, autoimmune issues, encephalitis, paralysis, and death, (which are 
listed on lengthy vaccine inserts).89 
It is simply incorrect to claim that diseases like diphtheria, polio, and 
hepatitis B, that would have to be contracted (and survived) for a person to 
 
 83  Torrey Love Complaint, supra note 65, at 12.  
 84 For adults, the main route is sexual.  For children, other routes exist, and the epidemiology is often 
unknown.  See W. Ray Kim, Epidemiology of Hepatitis B in the United States, 49 HEPATOLOGY 28, 28–
34 (2009) (discussing the differences between children and adults  in routes of hepatitis B 
transmissions).  Before the vaccine, about 16,000 children under the age of ten were infected each 
year, about half through infected mothers, the rest through other routes.  In other words, the 
implication that this is mostly a sexually transmitted disease that is not a risk for children is incorrect.  
See Gregory L. Armstrong et al., Childhood Hepatitis B Virus Infections in the United States before Hepatitis 
B Immunization, 108 PEDIATRICS 1123, 1123 (2001) (finding thousands of American children were 
infected by hepatitis B each year before routine HPV immunization). When a child gets hepatitis 
B, the risk of chronic infection that can lead to liver disease and cancer is much, much higher. Id.  
 85 Epidemiology and Prevention of Vaccine-Preventable Diseases, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & 
PREVENTION (Sept. 8, 2015), https://www.cdc.gov/vaccines/pubs/pinkbook/ 
tetanus.html#complications (defining and describing the tetanus disease and its characteristics).  
 86 Torrey Love Complaint, supra note 65, at 12.  
 87 Second Amended Complaint, at 6, Buck v. Smith, No. 2:16-cv-05111-GHK-MRW (C.D. Cal  July 
21, 2016) [hereinafter  Buck Complaint].  
 88 Allopathic is a term those who prefer alternative medicine over traditional, science-based medicine 
use to refer to traditional medicine.  Allopathy, THEFREEDICTIONARY: MEDICAL DICTIONARY 
(accessed Sept. 18, 2018), http://medical-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/allopathy.  
 89  Buck Complaint, supra note 87, at 6. 
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have natural immunity, come with no risk of harmful side effects.  To use 
two of the examples in Buck, encephalitis is one of the risks of measles,90 and 
paralysis one of the risks of polio.91   In fact, without vaccines, the diseases in 
question are estimated to cause tens of thousands of deaths and millions of 
cases of illness in a single birth cohort.92 
The Middleton v. Pan suit had an even more extreme set of factual claims.  
The whole basis for the complaint is that SB277 is a conspiracy to harm 
children, based on a belief that vaccines are extremely dangerous.93  One 
claim used to make that point is an emphasis on vaccine ingredients, a 
common anti-vaccine trope; while the ingredients may sound frightening to 
people without scientific background (like most of us), in the tiny amounts 
found in vaccines they are not, in fact, harmful.94  To give one example, the 
plaintiffs express concerns about aluminum salts used in vaccines.  Aluminum 
salts have been used as adjuvants in vaccines since the 1920s, and have an 
excellent safety record.95  Plaintiffs disagree.  But the sources they use to 
address this are the FDA’s limits for intravenous feeding of infants—daylong 
provision of solution directly into an infant’s vein—and articles about the risks 
from such IV feeding of premature babies.96  That is very different from 
vaccines, injected into the muscle—not directly into a vein—once every few 
months.97  Because of this distinction, it is not a good counter to sources that 
are actually on point.  The FDA does have limits for vaccines, and the 
schedule does not exceed them. 98  Further, the FDA studied the safety of 
 
 90 Walter A. Orenstein, Robert T. Perry & Neal Halsey, The Clinical Significance of Measles: A Review, 
189 J. INFECTIOUS DISEASES 4, 7–8 (2004). 
 91 Epidemiology and Prevention of Vaccine-Preventable Diseases, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & 
PREVENTION (Apr. 2015), https://www.cdc.gov/vaccines/pubs/pinkbook/downloads/polio.pdf. 
 92 Fangjun Zhou et al., Economic Evaluation of the Routine Childhood Immunization Program in the United States, 
2009, 133 PEDIATRICS 1, 1 (2014). 
 93 Complaint at 4–5, Middleton v. Pan, 2017 WL 7053936 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 15, 2016) (No. 2:16-cv-
05224-SVW-AGR) [hereinafter Middleton Complaint].  
 94 Paul A. Offit & Rita K. Jew, Special Article, Addressing Parents’ Concerns: Do Vaccines Contain Harmful 
Preservatives, Adjuvants, Additives, or Residuals?, 112 PEDIATRICS 1 (2003); see also Reiss & Weithorn, 
supra note 21, at 944–45.  
 95 Bruno Guy, The Perfect Mix: Recent Progress in Adjuvant Research, 5 NATURE REVS. MICROBIOLOGY 
505, 514 (2007); Philippa Marrack et al., Towards an Understanding of the Adjuvant Action of Aluminium, 
9(4) NAT. REV. IMMUNOLOGY 287, 293 (2009).  
 96 Middleton Complaint, supra note 93, at 7.  
 97 On the differences between intravenous and intramuscular routes for this purpose, as well as the 
absorption and effect, see Robert J. Mitkus et al., Updated Aluminum Pharmacokinetics Following Infant 
Exposures Through Diet and Vaccination, 29 VACCINE 9538, 9541 (2011) and Tammy Z. Movsas et al., 
Effect of Routine Vaccination on Aluminum and Essential Element Levels in Preterm Infants, 167 [J]AMA 
PEDIATRICS 870, 871 (2013).  
 98 See 21 C.F.R. § 610.15 (2017) (prescribing limits to the amount of ingredients, preservatives, diluents, 
and adjuvants allowed in vaccines, including aluminum content); see also Offit & Jew, supra note 94; 
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aluminum salts used in the infant vaccine schedule and found them safe.99 
Similarly, the complaint’s discussion of formaldehyde—another 
ingredient it highlights—ignores the fact that, aside from its presence in 
many fruits, formaldehyde is created by the human body as part of our 
metabolism.100   It is already present in infants’ blood in much, much higher 
amounts than those in vaccines.101  
In short, several of the lawsuits attempt to challenge the scientific 
consensus on vaccines, but the arguments used are extremely problematic, 
with little use of expert sources or evidence of expertise.  
B.  Basic Principles 
The biggest challenge facing the plaintiffs in any of these lawsuits—and 
any other across the United States—is that a jurisprudence founded on 
strong basic principles has consistently upheld vaccine mandates at both the 
state and federal level.  
Judge Sabraw, ruling in Whitlow, explained that: “For more than 100 
years, the United States Supreme Court has upheld the right of the States to 
enact and enforce laws requiring citizens to be vaccinated.”102   
In the following paragraphs I will emphasize three basic principles that 
support immunization mandates.  First, for over a century—and possibly 
dating back to the beginning of the Republic—public health has been a core 
state function, an area where states had acknowledged powers and 
responsibility.  Second, while individual liberties are important, our 
jurisprudence has always acknowledged that individual liberty can be limited 
to protect the public health—indeed, that without that society cannot exist.   
Third, school mandates occupy a special sphere in which state power to 
regulate is especially strong: they are justified by both public health and 
protection of children’s health, two powerful interests, and conversely, 
because the core individual right they affect—parental freedom to make 
decisions for their children—runs against both the child’s welfare and the 
welfare of those outside the family, it is at its weakest there.   
 
Vaccine Ingredients—Aluminum, CHILD. HOSP. PHILA. (2018), http://www.chop.edu/centers-
programs/vaccine-education-center/vaccine-ingredients/aluminum. 
 99 Robert J. Mitkus et al., Updated Aluminum Pharmacokinetics Following Infant Exposures Through Diet and 
Vaccination, 29 VACCINE 9538, 9542–43 (2011). 
 100 Robert J. Mitkus et al., Pharmacokinetic Modeling as an Approach to Assessing the Safety of Residual 
Formaldehyde in Infant Vaccines, 31 VACCINE 2738 (2013).  
 101 Offit & Jew, supra note 94.  
 102  Whitlow v. California, 203 F. Supp. 3d 1079, 1083 (S.D. Cal. 2016). 
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While the states’ police power is not well defined, courts have clearly and 
consistently ruled (at least since the nineteenth century) that it encompasses 
a state’s power to regulate for the public health.103  In 1905, in Jacobson v. 
Massachusetts, the United States Supreme Court upheld a statute requiring 
vaccination against smallpox on those grounds.  The Court, addressing the 
tension between public health and individual rights, stated that:  
[T]he liberty secured by the Constitution of the United States to every 
person within its jurisdiction does not import an absolute right in each 
person to be, at all times and in all circumstances, wholly freed from 
restraint.   There are manifold restraints to which every person is necessarily 
subject for the common good.  On any other basis, organized society could 
not exist with safety to its members. . . . Real liberty for all could not exist 
under the operation of a principle which recognizes the right of each 
individual person to use his own, whether in respect of his person or his 
property, regardless of the injury that may be done to others.104 
Jacobson clearly acknowledged that the ability of states to limit individual 
rights were not absolute—it explained that: 
[I]t might be that an acknowledged power of a local community to protect 
itself against an epidemic threatening the safety of all, might be exercised in 
particular circumstances and in reference to particular persons in such an 
arbitrary, unreasonable manner, or might go so far beyond what was 
reasonably required for the safety of the public, as to authorize or compel 
the courts to interfere for the protection of such persons.105 
However, the authority in Jacobson clearly allowed states to put in place 
reasonable regulations limiting personal freedom, and it is clearly 
acknowledged today that states have authority to use quarantine powers, 
which directly interfere in civil liberties,106 to mandate seatbelts,107 and other 
public health intervention in personal behavior like smoking bans and drinking 
while driving.108  It is clear today that individual liberties can be limited for 
public health purposes—though the states’ authority to do so has limits, too.109  
 
 
 103 See Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 62 (1872) (recognizing for the first time that the police power 
allows states to regulate for the public’s wellbeing). 
 104 Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 26 (1905).  
 105 Id. at 28 (citing Wis., Minn., & Pac. R.R. Co. v. Jacobson, 179 U.S. 287, 301 (1900)).  
 106 Lawrence O. Gostin, Public Health Law in a New Century Part II: Public Health Powers and Limits, 283 
[J]AMA 2979, 2980 (2000).  
 107 Jeffrey L. Thomas, The Freedom to Be Foolish? L.B. 496: The Mandatory Seatbelt Law, 19 CREIGHTON 
L. REV. 743, 748 (1986) (“[T]here are few reported cases in which the constitutionality of 
mandatory seat belt laws has been challenged.”).  
 108 George A. Mensah et al., Law as a Tool for Preventing Chronic Diseases: Expanding the Spectrum of Effective 
Public Health Strategies, 1 PREVENTING CHRONIC DISEASES 1, 3 (2004). 
 109 Gostin, supra note 106, at 2980–82.  
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There is every reason to think a mandate with no non-medical 
exemption—like the one embodied in SB277—is well within the reasonable 
limits of state police powers.  In a recent article, Professor Lois Weithorn and 
I addressed the fact that Jacobson is still correct and applicable when it comes 
to children’s immunization (but may be challenged on several grounds when 
attempting to criminalize adult refusal to be immunized).110  In relation to 
childhood vaccines, limiting parents’ liberty is supported by both the child’s 
interest to be free from disease—an interest the state can legitimately protect 
—and the public health.111  It is important to remember what parents are 
demanding when they challenge school mandates.  The parents in question 
do not only claim the freedom to reject a global expert consensus that 
vaccines’ risks are small, and smaller than their benefits, and leave their child 
at risk of preventable diseases.  They also claim the freedom to create a risk 
of outbreak in the school, an outbreak that would affect other children and 
the community in general, by sending their children to school unvaccinated.  
Our courts have not been sympathetic to that demand.  
In 1922, relying on Jacobson, the Supreme Court upheld a city ordinance 
requiring that children be vaccinated before attending schools (public and 
private), an ordinance with no exemption.112  The Zucht v. King Court rejected 
both a due process and an equal protection challenge to the ordinance.113  
While the Supreme Court has not directly ruled on the constitutionality 
of vaccine mandates since, in obiter dictum in Prince v. Massachusetts,114 the 
Court made the strong statement that:  
[A parent] cannot claim freedom from compulsory vaccination for the child 
more than for himself on religious grounds. The right to practice religion 
freely does not include liberty to expose the community or the child to 
communicable disease or the latter to ill health or death.115  
No court, state or federal, has ever struck down an immunization 
mandate, and many have upheld them.  Most recently, two circuit courts of 
appeals rejected such challenges.  In Workman v. Mingo County Board of 
Education, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals addressed a challenge to West 
Virginia’s school immunization mandate, which does not have a non-
medical exemption—and rejected it, finding the mandate constitutional.116 
 
 110 Reiss & Weithorn, supra note 21, at 895–915. 
 111 Id.  
 112 Zucht v. King, 260 U.S. 174, 176 (1922).  
 113 Id. at 176.  
 114 321 U.S. 158 (1944). 
 115 Id. at 166–67. 
 116 419 F. App’x 348, 355–56 (4th Cir. 2011).   
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Similarly, in Phillips v. City of New York,117 the Second Circuit Court of Appeals 
rejected a challenge to New York’s immunization mandate.  
SB277 challengers faced a formidable background: a strong 
jurisprudence supporting vaccine mandates, solidly grounded in the 
important interests they protect: child’s health and the community’s health.  
SB277 opponents tried to counter the jurisprudence by reframing the facts, 
by attempting to distinguish the jurisprudence from modern reality, or by 
downplaying the jurisprudence and instead reaching for other legal 
arguments.  However, challenges to SB277 cannot and should not win 
without providing a strong basis—factual and legal—for deviating from the 
jurisprudence, and so far, the cases have not.  
Relevant to this section, three of the lawsuits—Whitlow, Torrey-Love, and 
Buck—also tried to distinguish the cases.  In Whitlow, the plaintiffs’ attorneys 
raised several arguments in attempts to distinguish from previous 
jurisprudence.  For example, during the preliminary hearing118 Attorney 
Turner, speaking for the plaintiffs, suggested that the court in Zucht  “did not 
reach the constitutional issues.”  But that is incorrect.  What the Zucht Court 
actually said was: 
But, although the validity of a law was formally drawn in question, it is our 
duty to decline jurisdiction whenever it appears that the constitutional 
question presented is not, and was not at the time of granting the writ, 
substantial in character.  Long before this suit was instituted, Jacobson v. 
Massachusetts had settled that it is within the police power of a state to provide 
for compulsory vaccination.  That case and others had also settled that a 
state may, consistently with the federal Constitution, delegate to a 
municipality authority to determine under what conditions health 
regulations shall become operative.119 
In other words, the court declared that the constitutional issues were 
decided and clear, and in essence, reaffirmed that previous jurisprudence and 
its constitutional findings.  
In the hearing mentioned above, Attorney Rosenberg attempted to 
distinguish Phillips by pointing out—correctly—that New York has a 
religious exemption, and that two of the cases in Phillips were catholic parents 
that had an exemption but whose children were kept out of school during an 
outbreak.120  This is a correct depiction of the circumstances that brought 
 
 117 775 F.3d 538, 542 (2d Cir. 2015) (per curiam) (upholding New York state requirement that students 
be vaccinated in order to attend public school). 
 118 Transcript of Motion Hearing at 13, Whitlow v. California, 203 F. Supp. 3d 1079 (S.D. Cal. 2016) 
(No. 16CV1715-DMS).  
 119 Zucht v. King, 260 U.S. 174, 176 (1922) (internal citations omitted) (citing Sugarman v. United 
States, 249 U.S. 182, 184 (1919)).  
 120 Transcript of Motion Hearing, supra note 118, at 28. 
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two of the plaintiffs to court (the third was denied a religious exemption), but 
it is not the legal question the court addressed, or apparently, the plaintiffs 
pleaded.  Phillips opens by saying: 
Plaintiffs brought this action challenging on constitutional grounds New 
York State’s requirement that all children be vaccinated in order to attend 
public school.  Plaintiffs argued that the statutory vaccination requirement, 
which is subject to medical and religious exemptions, violates their 
substantive due process rights, the Free Exercise Clause of the First 
Amendment, the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
the Ninth Amendment, and both state and municipal law.121 
In other words, while the scenario that brought two of the plaintiffs to 
court was different than the one facing SB277 plaintiffs (the third situation 
was a more direct parallel, a child refused admission unless vaccinated), the 
argument was the same—and the decision directly relevant.122 
Similarly, Attorney Rosenberg for the plaintiffs suggested Workman did 
not address the educational issue at focus here123—but while she’s right that 
a state’s constitutional right to education was not discussed in Workman, other 
claims raised by the plaintiffs were.  
Torrey-Love made a more systematic effort to distinguish past precedent. 
In its request for preliminary injunction, the plaintiffs’ complaint made a 
number of points.  First, they pointed to the fact that Jacobson was cited in 
Buck v. Bell,124 in which the Supreme Court upheld forced sterilization, to 
suggest Jacobson does not comport with modern values.125  While Buck is a 
stain on our jurisprudence and a very, very problematic case,126 it is not 
Jacobson; modern sensibilities are rightly outraged by forced sterilization,127 
but there is—appropriately—overwhelming support for vaccines that protect 
children from diseases and save lives.128  Jacobson is maintained as a leading 
 
 121 Phillips, 775 F.3d at 540.  
 122 Whether or not the broader argument was a litigation strategy error on the part of the attorney 
handling Phillips—or whether combining the two cases opposing exclusion during an outbreak with 
a case directly attacking the lack of exemption—can be debated, and is not the focus of this Article.  
 123 Transcript of Motion Hearing, supra note 118,  at 28.  
 124 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927). 
 125  Plaintiffs’ Notice of Motion and Motion for a  for Preliminary Injunction, and Memorandum of 
Points and Authorities in Support of Motion for a Preliminary Injunction at 10, Torrey-Love v. 
Cal. Dep’t of Educ., No. 5:16-cv-2410-DMG-DTB (C.D. Cal. Dec. 8, 2016) [hereinafter Torrey-
Love Preliminary Injunction Motion]. 
 126 See Paul A. Lombardo, Three Generations, No Imbeciles: New Light on Buck v. Bell, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
30, 31 (1985) (“In the almost sixty years since Buck v. Bell was decided, commentators have 
repeatedly attempted to understand its more problematic aspects.”). 
 127 PAUL A. OFFIT, PANDORA’S LAB 108–110 (2017) (showing how disease outbreak can undermine 
education).  
 128 Cary Funk, Brian Kennedy & Meg Hefferon, Vast Majority of Americans Say Benefits of Childhood Vaccines 
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case in public health where Buck v. Bell has long been relegated to the dustbin 
of historical embarrassments because Jacobson protects important interests. 
The Torrey-Love plaintiffs also attempted to distinguish Jacobson by 
construing it narrowly (as did other litigants).  In their motion for preliminary 
injunction, plaintiffs stated:  
The proper view recognizes Jacobson and its progeny as narrow, limited, and 
distinguishable, consistent with modern precedent.  The Jacobson line of 
cases articulated that (a) a relatively self-contained township; (b) could 
require an individual to be vaccinated against a highly contagious, airborne 
disease; (c) or pay a fine; (d) during a serious outbreak of the same disease; 
(e) before the era of widespread travel made such mandates less 
meaningful.129  
In footnote 9 to the Request, plaintiffs added: “The Jacobson line must be 
read to impose limitations on the state’s police power in these situations, 
including requirements of necessity, reasonableness, proportionality, and 
clear harm avoidance.”130  
Plaintiffs reiterated:  
Once more, Jacobson and Zucht are instructive and provide a stark contrast 
to the present situation.  In those cases, towns passed laws, before the era of 
international travel—indeed before much travel at all.  Therefore, the 
ordinances there were credibly tailored to meet its ends.  The folly of 
burdening California schoolchildren and infringing their fundamental 
rights, while millions of unvaccinated foreign children alone visit the state 
each year, is manifest.131  
The first problem plaintiffs run into in this attempt to distinguish is that 
two of their distinctions—the existence of an outbreak and the penalty in 
Jacobson—are countered by Zucht.  In Zucht, the Supreme Court, citing 
Jacobson, upheld a school immunization mandate with no exemptions, at a 
time when there was no active outbreak.   In other words, attempts to narrow 
Jacobson to a fine and an outbreak cannot pass the barrier of Zucht. 
 
 
Outweigh Risks, PEW RES. CTR. (Feb. 2, 2017), http://www.pewinternet.org/2017/02/02/vast-
majority-of-americans-say-benefits-of-childhood-vaccines-outweigh-risks/; see also U.S. Infant 
Vaccination Rates High, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (Aug. 28, 2014), 
https://www.cdc.gov/media/releases/2014/p0828-infant-vaccination.html ; Immunization, CTRS. 
FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (May 03, 2017), https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/fastats/ 
immunize.htm (noting that the vast majority of infants aged nineteen to thirty-five months had 
received vaccinations for a variety of diseases). 
 129 Torrey-Love Preliminary Injunction Motion, supra note 125, at 10–11 (footnotes omitted). 
 130 Id. at 11 n. 9.  
 131 Id. at 14–15 (footnote omitted).  Note that the claim of infringing on the children’s constitutional 
rights is the focus of the litigation, and not, as the plaintiffs phrase it, a foregone conclusion.  
Arguably, protecting children from disease supports their right to life.   
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Furthermore, in Whitlow, Judge Sabraw also addressed the claim of an 
existence of an outbreak in Jacobson, and explained that the state’s interest in 
protecting the health of children does not depend on the existence of a public 
health emergency.132  He could also have gone further and reminded us that 
Jacobson itself relied on school immunization requirements—not all of which 
were during outbreaks—in its ruling, finding that an acceptable use of state 
powers.133 
Necessity does not by itself mean that there has to be an ongoing outbreak, 
rather than a need to prevent one.  The state does not have to wait for children 
to be sick, die, or for costs to accumulate before adopting evidence-based 
public health measures.  It can adopt them to prevent such a result.  
The other arguments are just as problematic.  The “highly contagious, 
airborne disease” claim applies just as much to several diseases we vaccinate 
against, such as measles, chickenpox, whooping cough, and diphtheria.  But 
the fact that a dangerous disease is transmitted in another way doesn’t remove 
its risk.  Polio, for example, is very dangerous, and can be transmitted in the 
school context.134  Limiting school immunization mandates just to airborne 
diseases would leave children at unnecessary risk of other harmful diseases. 
As to the fact that Jacobson and Zucht preceded modern air travel, the claim 
seemed based on a misunderstanding of the way herd immunity operates.135  
Herd immunity is even more important in a period of international travel.  
Herd immunity means that enough people in the population are immune to 
a disease that even if the disease is introduced, it will not reach the susceptible 
people and outbreaks will either not happen at all or be limited and easily 
contained.136  While an outbreak can certainly happen in a small, confined 
community, in an era of international travel, the chances of a case being 
introduced into the community are higher, not lower.  Essentially, the size of 
the “herd” is now bigger, and the community is no longer isolated—with these 
interconnections increasing the risk of exposure.  For example, an 
unvaccinated child can travel abroad to a measles endemic country and 
return with an infection—as has happened in the past.137  Generally, the CDC 
 
 132 Whitlow v. California, 203 F. Supp. 3d 1079, 1090 (S.D. Cal. 2016)  
 133 Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 31–35 (1905). 
 134 See, e.g., Louis Weinstein, Poliomyelitis—A Persistent Problem, 288 NEW ENG. J. MED. 370, 370 (1973) 
(discussing a school-centered outbreak of the polio virus). 
 135 See Fine et al., supra note 20, at 911 (“Many examples of herd immunity have been described, 
illustrating the importance of indirect protection for predicting the short- and long-term impact of 
vaccination programs, for justifying them economically, and for understanding the nature of the 
immunity induced by various vaccines.”).  
 136 Reiss, supra note 18, at 7–8.  
 137 David E. Sugerman et al., Measles Outbreak in a Highly Vaccinated Population, San Diego, 2008: Role of the 
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explains that “Travelers with measles continue to bring the disease into the 
U.S.” and “Measles can spread when it reaches a community in the U.S. 
where groups of people are unvaccinated.”138  Unvaccinated visitors who 
carry infections can infect unvaccinated children they interact with; those 
children can in turn infect classmates and start an outbreak in their schools.  
In other words, because we live in an era of international travel, and diseases 
are routinely brought into the states by travelers, or United States based 
travelers visit areas where diseases are endemic, having higher immunization 
rates is crucial to prevent outbreaks.  By limiting the number of unvaccinated 
and unprotected children in communities, and especially in the high-
transmission environment of the school,139 SB277 is very well tailored to meet 
the end of preventing disease outbreaks.  
In other words, the attempts to distinguish Jacobson and Zucht and the 
subsequent cases were unconvincing, and indeed, those courts that had an 
opportunity to examine them rejected them.140  Litigants were therefore 
forced to try and look elsewhere to challenge the existing jurisprudence.  
IV.  SCHOOL MANDATES AND LEGAL CLAIMS 
The focus of the rest of this Article is on the legal arguments made by 
SB277 opponents in their effort to challenge the act, and why the courts in 
question were correct to reject those arguments.   The arguments are 
arranged from strongest to weakest.  I consider the strongest (but still far from 
compelling) arguments to be the claim that SB277 violates the right to 
education embodied in the California constitution, violates the First 
Amendment by requiring parents with religious objections to vaccinate, and 
 
Intentionally Undervaccinated, 125 PEDIATRICS 747, 748 (2010). 
 138 Measles Cases and Outbtreaks, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (Jan. 9, 2018) 
https://www.cdc.gov/measles/cases-outbreaks.html. 
 139 See Muireann Brennan et al., Evidence for Transmission of Pertussis in Schools, Massachusetts, 1996: 
Epidemiologic Data Supported by Pulsed-Field Gel Electrophoresis Studies, 181 J. INFECTIOUS DISEASES 210, 
214 (2000) (“[S]everal lines of evidence suggest that pertussis transmission occurred in 
Massachusetts in 1996 and that school-aged children, particularly those aged 10-19 years, played 
an important role in the statewide outbreak.”); Alan Hinman et al., Childhood Immunization: Laws that 
Work, 30 J.L., MED. & ETHICS  122, 123 (2002) (noting that many vaccine-preventable diseases 
were primarily being transmitted at school); Dieter Schenzle, An Age-Structured Model of Pre- and Post-
Vaccination Measles Transmission, 1 IMA J. MATHEMATICS APPLIED MED. & BIOLOGY 169, 169 
(1984) (discussing the fact that schools are areas of high disease transmission).  
 140 Whitlow v. California, 203 F. Supp. 3d 1079, 1092 (S.D. Cal. 2016).  The federal district court that 
dismissed Torrey-Love made short work of the cases, saying: “Though Plaintiffs assail these cases for 
their age, they have not been overturned and are still good law and binding upon this Court.”  
Torrey-Love v. California, No. 5:16-cv2410-DMG-DTB, slip op. at 6 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 12, 2017) 
(footnote omitted). 
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the new and creative argument that SB277 runs afoul of the unconstitutional 
conditions doctrine, because the existing jurisprudence does not directly 
address the first and the last, and because the question of religious freedom 
is a current and contentious one.  
Less strong, but still plausible, are the claims that SB277 violates parental 
rights, substantive due process and equal protection.  These are weaker 
claims because existing jurisprudence—either on school mandates or more 
generally—clearly addresses them and likely forecloses them.  
Finally, I address two completely implausible arguments, founded on 
misunderstanding of law—the argument that the state cannot mandate 
products that are unavoidably unsafe or that liability protections cannot co-
exist with mandates and the claim legislators violating the law were involved 
in a criminal conspiracy.  These claims are addressed as a public service: 
while implausible, they are likely to appeal to those without background in 
law, and may be raised both in legislative debates and in lawsuits.  By 
addressing them here, I hope to arm legislators and courts with ready 
counters, saving them work.  These last arguments also demonstrate, in my 
view, the extreme worldview of some of the litigants, and thus shed light on 
the extreme edges of the anti-vaccine movement.  
A.  The Strongest Claims  
1.  A Constitutional Right to Education 
Each of the lawsuits claimed that SB277 violates the right to education, 
a fundamental right under California’s constitution.141  For example, the 
plaintiffs in Whitlow said: 
Plaintiff’s children have a fundamental right to education. . . .  Serrano I 
explained why education is a protected, fundamental right, citing (1) its 
relationship to economic advancement; (2) its relevance to all aspects of 
social life; (3) its duration of ten to thirteen years; (4) its impact on children’s 
emotional and psychological health; and (5) its compulsory nature.  Strict 
Scrutiny must be applied to violations of fundamental protected rights under 
the California State Constitution, or where suspect classifications are at 
issue.142 
This state law claim is likely the strongest claim the cases have, because 
it had not been directly addressed by our jurisprudence, and is not 
 
 141 CAL. CONST. art. IX, §1. 
 142 Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Temporary 
Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction, at 6, Whitlow v. California, 203 F. Supp. 3d 1079 
(S.D. Cal. 2016) (No. 3:16-cv-1715-DMS-BGS) (citing Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584 (1971)). 
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implausible.   There is no federally protected right to education.143  But many 
states have constitutional clauses addressing education.  California’s 
constitution addresses education in Article IX Section 1 states: 
A general diffusion of knowledge and intelligence being essential to the 
preservation of the rights and liberties of the people, the Legislature shall 
encourage by all suitable means the promotion of intellectual, scientific, 
moral, and agricultural improvement.144 
The subsequent constitutional sections set out many administrative 
details of how the system will operate.145  In the 1970s, in a series of cases 
addressing the funding of California’s educational system, the Supreme 
Court of California found that California’s school funding system was 
unconstitutional because it implicated a suspect category (wealth) in the 
context of a fundamental interest (education).146  Serrano v. Priest correctly 
stands for the premise that education is a fundamental interest under the 
California constitution, and for the importance of access to education.  The 
question is whether SB277 violates it.  
There are at least three compelling arguments against the claim that 
SB277 violates the right to education.  First, a starting point is that schools 
were never an unregulated sphere, and regulating schools for health and 
safety is one of the traditional roles of the state.147  A vaccine mandate is one 
such health and safety regulation.  Arguably, reducing the risks of outbreaks 
protects education, since outbreaks undermine education in several ways.  
Outbreaks undermine the education of the children who fall ill during the 
 
 143 San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 (1973). 
 144 CAL. CONST. art. IX, § 1. This language is fairly typical—many state constitutions have provisions 
focused on public education.  For example, Florida’s constitution says:  
The education of children is a fundamental value of the people of the State of Florida.  
It is, therefore, a paramount duty of the state to make adequate provision for the education 
of all children residing within its borders.  Adequate provision shall be made by law for a 
uniform, efficient, safe, secure, and high quality system of free public schools that allows 
students to obtain a high quality education and for the establishment, maintenance, and 
operation of institutions of higher learning and other public education programs that the 
needs of the people may require.   
  FLA. CONST. art. IX, §1.  Oklahoma’s says: “Provisions shall be made for the establishment and 
maintenance of a system of public schools, which shall be open to all children of the state . . . .”  
OKLA. CONST. art. I, § 5.  Arizona’s states: “The Legislature shall establish and maintain a system 
of free public schools wherein all the children of the State may be educated.”  Arizona’s says: “The 
legislature shall enact such laws as shall provide for the establishment and maintenance of a general 
and uniform public school system . . . .”  ARIZ. CONST. art. XI, § 1. 
 145 CAL. CONST. art. IX, §§ 2–14. 
 146 Serrano v. Priest (Serrano I), 487 P.2d 1241, 1255, 1258 (Cal. 1971); see also Serrano v. Priest 
(Serrano II), 557 P.2d 929, 948 (Cal. 1976) (en banc). 
 147 Dorit Rubinstein Reiss, Vaccines, School Mandates, and California’s Right to Education, 63 UCLA L. REV. 
DISCOURSE 98, 108 (2015). 
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outbreak, even more so if they are permanently disabled or killed by the 
disease.148  Outbreaks also undermine education for unimmunized children 
who need to be kept at home during the outbreak.149  In fact, since 
vaccinating the child also helps to keep the child safe while in school, 
something squarely within a parent’s responsibility, and squarely connected 
to the child’s right to education (a child will not be getting an education if 
sick, or worse, hurt by a disease), conditioning access to school on protecting 
the child from disease is not squarely a clash.  
An article written during the SB277 legislative process points out that in 
at least one settled case brought under Serrano, the state’s duty to preserve the 
health of California’s children while at school was emphasized—something 
school mandates support.150  Opponents of SB277 attempt to use Serrano to 
prevent the state from regulating schools to protect health.  However, Serrano 
focused on providing access to schools and preventing wealth-based 
discrimination.   Therefore, such an argument takes Serrano out of context 
and undermines education—a fundamental interest.  
In addition, when we are talking about access to education, it is important 
to remember that there is one more group whose access is affected by 
vaccination rates.  Children with medical conditions that prevent vaccination 
are often especially vulnerable to the risks of infectious diseases—for example, 
children with cancer, or with transplants.  When immunization rates in school 
drop, those parents are faced with the choice of allowing the child into an area 
vulnerable to outbreaks, risking the child’s life, or leaving the child out of 
school—with the consequence of limiting that child’s access to education.  
Strong school mandates protect that child, and allow her access to the school.  
While not a legal barrier, it is a very real barrier to access.  Why should we 
prefer the access of the child whose parents chose not to vaccinate over the 
access of the child whose parents cannot vaccinate?151 
 
 148 Id. at 109–10. 
 149 Id. 
 150 Elaine Won, Protecting Our Children: The California Public School Vaccination Mandate Debate, 10 CAL. 
LEGAL HIST. 471, 479 (2015). 
 151 Reiss, supra note 147, at 108.  For example, one of the speakers during the SB277 debate was six 
year old Rhett Krawitt, a recovering leukemia patient who, because of his disease, could not be 
vaccinated and was at risk during the measles outbreak.  Because of the high rate of unvaccinated 
children in his school, Rhett was at risk when attending the school, leading his family to express 
concern about sending him there.  See Jon Brooks, Boy Leukemia Patient Weighs in as Big Vaccine 
Exemption Vote Nears, KQED (June 23, 2015), https://www.kqed.org/stateofhealth/39317/boy-
leukemia-patient-weighs-in-as-vote-on-vaccine-bill-nears; Tamar Lewin, Sick Child’s Father Seeks 
Vaccination Requirement in California, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 28, 2015), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/29/us/father-of-boy-with-leukemia-asks-california-school-
officials-to-bar-unvaccinated-students.html. 
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Finally, because of the importance of the interest protected by school 
mandates—that of preventing diseases that can kill, harm, or maim – the 
right to education does not bar them.  That is the reason that early cases 
addressing school mandates in states that had a constitutional right to 
education upheld them.152  In Whitlow, Judge Sabraw also addressed the 
question what happens if the right to education is subject to heightened 
review without ruling whether that is the case.  He pointed out that our 
jurisprudence implicitly or explicitly acknowledged that states have a 
compelling interest in “fighting the spread of infectious diseases through 
mandatory vaccination of school-aged children,” and went through a review 
of the extensive jurisprudence supporting the point.153  In relation to whether 
SB277 is the least restrictive means, the judge pointed to California’s goal, as 
declared in the preamble to its school mandate statute—a goal of achieving 
total immunization.154  The judge concluded that “[t]he objective of total 
immunization is not served by a law that allows for PBEs, whether the PBE 
rate is 2% or 25%.”155   
In other words, the goal of achieving total immunization, with the view 
of preventing diseases as much as possible, is a legitimate one, protecting a 
compelling interest—and there is no real alternative to removing the PBE to 
achieve it. 
In ruling on this issue in Buck, the Court of Appeal of the Second 
Appellate District—the only appellate decision on this so far—went further: 
Plaintiffs allege in their complaint that Senate Bill No. 277 is not narrowly 
tailored to meet the state’s interest, because there are less restrictive 
alternatives (such as alternative means (unspecified) of immunization, and 
quarantine in the event of an outbreak of disease).  This argument fails, of 
course, as compulsory immunization has long been recognized as the gold 
standard for preventing the spread of contagious diseases.  As is noted in the 
legislative history, studies have found that “when belief exemptions to 
vaccination guidelines are permitted, vaccination rates decrease,” and 
community immunity wanes if large numbers of children do not receive 
required vaccinations.156  
 
 152 Viemeister v. White, 72 N.E. 97, 98 (N.Y. 1904) (“The right to attend the public schools of the state 
is necessarily subject to some restrictions and limitations in the interest of the public health . . . If 
vaccination strongly tends to prevent the transmission or spread of [smallpox], it logically follows 
that children may be refused admission to the public schools until they have been vaccinated.”); see 
also French v. Davidson, 143 Cal. 658, 662 (Cal. 1904) (holding that it is within the police power of 
the State of California to say whether all school children should be vaccinated).  
 153 Whitlow v. California, 203 F. Supp. 3d 1079, 1089–90 (S.D. Cal. 2016).  
 154 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §120325(a) (West 2016). 
 155 Whitlow, 203 F. Supp. 3d at 1091.  
 156  Brown v. Smith, 24 Cal. App. 5th 1135, 1146 (Cal. Ct. App. 2018) (citation omitted) (quoting 
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In a similar vein, Won pointed out that there is no support or reason to 
believe that less restrictive means would achieve the required rate for herd 
immunity—over ninety or ninety-four percent for the most contagious 
diseases—in schools where many parents are anti-vaccine.157  There is no 
real evidence, therefore, that less restrictive means like an educational 
requirement would protect the compelling interest of preventing outbreaks 
of potentially fatal diseases.  
Judge Sabraw concluded: 
The right of education, fundamental as it may be, is no more sacred than 
any of the other fundamental rights that have readily given way to a State’s 
interest in protecting the health and safety of its citizens, and particularly, 
school children.  Because a personal belief exemption is not required in the 
first instance, the State can remove it—and impinge on education rights–in 
light of the compelling interest here.  In this context, removal of the PBE is 
necessary or narrowly drawn to serve the compelling objective of SB 277.158 
As part of its argument in Whitlow that SB277 did not violate California’s 
Right to Education, the state cited several cases from the late nineteenth 
century and early twentieth century—all upholding school immunization 
mandates—on the basis that they do not violate the right to education.159  
While these cases provide legitimate legal support for upholding SB277, the 
arguments above are, in my view, stronger because the California cases in 
question preceded Serrano, and the effect of Serrano on school immunization 
mandates had not, at the beginning of the challenges, been litigated yet.  At 
this point, however, both several trial courts and the second appellate district 
have ruled against the claims.  
2.  The First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause 
Three of the lawsuits—Whitlow, Buck, and Middleton—raised a First 
Amendment claim.  In its strongest form, the claim is that freedom of 
religion, a fundamental right in our system, is undermined when parents with 
religious opposition to vaccines are required to vaccinate their children in 
order to send them to school.  Both Jacobson and Zucht predated the 
 
Assem. Comm. on Health, Analysis of S.B. No. 277, 2016 Reg. Sess., at 5 (Cal. 2015)).    
 157 Won, supra note 150, at 475–76, 499.  
 158 Whitlow, 203 F. Supp. 3d at 1091. 
 159 Abeel v. Clark, 24 P. 383, 383–84 (Cal. 1890) (upholding mandatory vaccination statute because 
the law operated uniformly on all school); Viemeister v. White, 72 N.E. 97, 98 (N.Y. 1904) 
(upholding mandatory vaccination as consistent with the New York state Constitution); see also 
Michelle M. Mello, David M. Studdert & Wendy E. Parmet, Shifting Vaccination Politics—The End of 
Personal-Belief Exemptions in California, 373 NEW ENG. J. MED., 785, 787 (2015) (defending SB277 
with state supreme court cases holding similar statutes as constitutional).  
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incorporation of the First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause towards the 
state.160  So litigants could reasonably claim that they did not address whether 
a religious exemption to immunization mandates is, today, constitutionally 
require—since the First Amendment, at the time, did not apply to states.  
That makes this claim, too, a plausible on—as does the fact that recent 
Supreme Court cases raise questions about the future interpretation of the 
First Amendment in this context.161 
Our jurisprudence, however, does not support this, and there are good 
grounds to think it will continue not to support it, at least in this context.  
First, in obiter in Prince v. Massachusetts, the court made it clear that freedom 
of religion “does not include liberty to expose the community or the child to 
communicable disease or the latter to ill health or death,”162 and hence a 
First Amendment claim cannot stand.  This statement was relied on in 
subsequent jurisprudence, most recently, at the federal appellate level, in 
Phillips v. City of New York.163  While the Prince statement focusing on vaccines 
is obiter, the ruling in the case was that even a combination of parental rights 
and religious freedom cannot overcome legislation that protects children—
in that case, child labor law—and vaccines were mentioned as an example 
of the application of that ruling.  The conclusion, as the Court suggested, is 
even stronger for requiring vaccines which protect both child and 
community than it is for the child labor laws addressed in the case, which 
affect primarily the child.    
Furthermore, even beyond the immunization context, under Employment 
Division v. Smith, legislatures are not required to offer a religious exemption 
from a neutral law of general applicability.164  Immunization mandates are 
clearly neutral on religion—they don’t target a specific religion, their focus is 
on preventing disease—and hence, under Smith, don’t require a specific 
mandate.165 
 
 160 But see Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 306–07 (1940) (incorporating the free exercise clause 
towards the state).  As a reminder, incorporation is the process by which the provisions of the Bill 
of Rights, which originally applied only to the federal government, were applied to the states.   
 161 Paul Horwitz, The Hobby Lobby Moment, 128 HARV. L. REV. 154, 154–158 (2014) (analyzing the 
possible avenues First Amendment jurisprudence might take in the coming years post Hobby Lobby).  
 162 Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166–67 (1944),  
 163 775 F.3d 538, 543 (2d Cir. 2015) (finding New York can constitutionally require that all children 
be vaccinated in order to attend public school). 
 164 Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990).  
 165 Note that Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. did not overturn Smith on this, focusing on the federal 
Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”), not the First Amendment.  134 S. Ct. 2751, 2760–
62 (2014).  In fact, both majority and dissent included language that supported Smith.  Id. at 2760, 
2790.  On whether RFRAs can pose an issue for vaccine mandates in states with religious freedom 
restoration acts, see generally Dina Nathanson, Herd Protection v. Vaccine Abstention: Potential Conflict 
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Some raised concern that the recent decision in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby 
Stores, Inc. may lead to expansion of a requirement of religious exemptions in 
at least some contexts, a development which could have a variety of 
potentially harmful effects in several contexts.166  However, Hobby Lobby itself 
did not suggest a move to rethink the interpretation of the First Amendment, 
and its opening clearly distinguished between interpreting the Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act it focused on and interpreting the First 
Amendment.167  Similarly, the more recently decided Masterpiece Cakeshop, 
Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission,168 which found in favor of a baker who 
refused to make a cake for a gay couple, did not overturn Smith.  The narrow 
majority decision strongly focused on the lack of neutrality on the part of the 
Colorado Civil Rights Commission, as expressed in their statements and 
actions.169  The Court’s focus was at what they saw as hostility to Mr. 
Phillips—the baker’s—religious point of view, and the Court found that 
unacceptable, in a 7-2 decision that included several of the liberal Justices on 
the court.170  In one sense, this is not new—the Court has, in the past, struck 
down actions where there was evidence of hostility of the government to a 
specific belief.171  Since SB277—or immunization laws generally—are pretty 
clearly not directed at a specific religious belief, but against non-
immunization, Masterpiece Cakeshop does not, arguably, touch it.  In fact, the 
change in the law removed a personal belief exemption that covered any 
belief—it did not have to be religious, and it certainly did not focus on a 
specific belief.172  However, there is a concern here.  Both Hobby Lobby and 
Masterpiece Cakeshop sided with an applicant seeking to expand his religious 
freedom.  While neither case is on point, insofar as they suggest an increasing 
emphasis of the Supreme Court on religious freedom, there is a valid 
 
Between School Vaccine Requirements and State Religious Freedom Restoration Acts, 42 AM. J.L. & MED. 621 
(2016).  This is an issue that deserves separate treatment, but may be beyond the scope of this 
Article, as California has not implemented a RFRA.  Reiss & Weithorn supra note 21, at 1612.  
 166 Alex J. Luchenitser, A New Era of Inequality? Hobby Lobby and Religious Exemptions from Anti-
Discrimination Laws, 28 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 63, 72–74 (2015); Ira C. Lupu, Hobby Lobby and 
the Dubious Enterprise of Religious Exemptions, 28 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 35, 92–100 (2015).  
 167 Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2760–62.  
 168 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018).  
 169 Id. at 1729–31. 
 170 Id. at 1731–34 (Kagan, J., concurring).  Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justice Sotomayor, dissented, 
though they, too, agreed with part of the majority’s criticism of the Commission.  Id. at 1748–52 
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting).   
 171 Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 545–46 (1993) (“A law burdening 
religious practice that is not neutral or not of general application must undergo the most rigorous 
of scrutiny.”).  
 172 S.B. 277, 2014–15 S., Reg. Sess. § 1(c) (Cal. 2015) (changing “Exemptions from immunization for 
medical reasons or personal beliefs” to “Exemptions from immunization for medical reasons”). 
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question about the continuous validity of Smith.  At the same time, the 
Supreme Court appears to be cautious in the steps it is making in this area, 
and at this point, there is no good reason to assume they will extend the First 
Amendment to undermine vaccines mandates—after all, the jurisprudence 
upholding vaccine mandates predated Smith, and was not touched even in 
the years before it.  
In Whitlow, the plaintiffs tried to deal with Smith by claiming that SB277 
involves a hybrid right.173  Rather than overruling the previous case of 
Wisconsin v. Yoder,174 the Smith court distinguished the case as applying to 
situations where there is a constellation of several rights—in Yoder, the 
combination of parental rights to make education choices for their children 
combined with religious freedom.175  In the case of vaccine mandates, 
arguably, parental liberty to make medical decisions combines with religious 
freedom in a similar constellation, and hence fits the category of hybrid 
rights.176  If the hybrid rights doctrine applied, the lack of religious exemption 
would be subject to strict scrutiny, which would reduce its chances of 
surviving (though not eliminate them, as I will discuss later).177 
The court in Whitlow rejected this claim, because “[t]he ‘hybrid rights 
doctrine has been widely criticized, and, notably, no court has ever allowed 
a plaintiff to bootstrap a free exercise claim in this manner.” Following that 
directive, this Court declines to apply the “hybrid rights” doctrine to 
Plaintiffs’ free exercise claim, and thus declines to apply strict scrutiny.178  
Two other reasons support rejecting the claim.  First, in Smith itself, the 
court mentioned forced vaccination as an example that shows the problems 
with requiring a religious exemption for every neutral law, suggesting that 
forced vaccination squarely falls under Smith’s general ruling, and the lesser 
requirement of school mandates even more so.179  Second, the recent case of 
 
 173 Whitlow v. California, 203 F. Supp. 3d 1074, 1086 n.4 (S.D. Cal. 2016) (“[T]hey argue they are 
asserting ‘hybrid rights,’ which warrants strict scrutiny.”).  
 174 See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 213–14 (1972) (holding that Amish children could not 
constitutionally be forced to attend public school past eighth grade by state law).  
 175 See Emp’t. Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881–82 (1990) (refusing to hold that “when otherwise 
prohibitable conduct is accompanied by religious convictions, . . . the conduct itself must be free 
from governmental regulation”). 
 176 Reiss & Weithorn, supra note 21, at 899 (exploring the idea of this possible hybrid right argument 
in a larger context). 
 177 Id. at 896–97 (stating that laws subject to strict scrutiny are less likely to be upheld). 
 178 Whitlow v. California, 203 F. Supp. 3d 1079, 1086 n.4 (S.D. Cal. 2016). 
 179 See Smith, 494 U.S. at 888–89 (“The rule respondents favor would open the prospect of 
constitutionally required religious exemptions . . . [to] compulsory vaccination laws.”). 
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Hobby Lobby180 suggests that the cases referred to as creating the hybrid rights 
doctrine are no longer a good framework.181 
The Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, therefore, does not 
prevent states from removing non-medical exemptions.  At least one court 
and one scholar go further: they consider religious exemptions to violate the 
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment182 and the Due 
Process Clause in it.183 
3.  Unconstitutional Conditions 
The plaintiffs in Torrey-Love tried to use the doctrine of unconstitutional 
conditions to challenge SB277.  They argued that SB277 impermissibly 
requires that children wanting to exercise their constitutional right to 
education give up rights to privacy, bodily autonomy, or that their parents 
give up the right to make medical decisions for their children. That, claims 
the complaint, is impermissible under our Supreme Court doctrine of 
unconstitutional conditions.184  The complaint in state court put it thus: 
If the state may compel the surrender of a constitutional right as a condition 
of its favor, then the guaranties embedded in the Constitution may be 
manipulated out of existence. In such case, the “government bears a heavy 
burden of demonstrating the practical necessity for [such a] limitation. At 
the very least it must establish that the imposed conditions relate to the 
purposes of the legislation which confers the benefit or privilege.”. . .  Put 
simply, the “state may not impose conditions which require the 
relinquishment of constitutional rights.”185  
The federal court that dismissed Torrey-Love did not thoroughly discuss 
the argument. It correctly pointed out that, under our jurisprudence, 
children do not have a fundamental right to refuse immunization before 
attending school.186  In essence, it rejected the plaintiffs’ attempt to frame the 
issue as separate rights to various things and pointed out the jurisprudence 
focused on whether immunization mandates are constitutional.  The court 
 
 180 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2760–62 (2014) (analyzing the movement 
away from the Sherbert test in recent decades by the Supreme Court).  
 181 See Reiss & Weithorn, supra note 21, at 899–900 (using Smith and Hobby Lobby to argue against 
vaccination refusal as a protected right under a hybrid rights theory). 
 182 See Brown v. Stone, 378 So. 2d 218, 223 (Miss. 1979) (holding that a religious exemption clause in 
a statute mandating vaccinations violates the Equal Protection Clause).  
 183 Allan J. Jacobs, Do Belief Exemptions to Compulsory Vaccination Programs Violate the Fourteenth Amendment?, 42 U. 
MEM. L. REV. 73, 98–102 (2011) (arguing that the holding in Brown could be upheld on either an Equal 
Protection basis, as Brown did, or under a Due Process basis by those who cannot receive vaccinations). 
 184 Torrey Love Complaint, supra note 65, at 10. 
 185 Id. (quoting Bagley v. Wash. Twp. Hosp. Dist., 421 P.2d 409, 414 (Cal. 1966)).  
 186 Torrey-Love v. California, 5:16-cv2410-DMG-DTB, slip op. at 6 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 12, 2017).  
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does not have to accept the plaintiffs’ framing, and following the specific 
jurisprudence is a legitimate way to handle the claim.  The federal court 
rejected the claim based on the fact that none of the rights claimed was 
absolute.187 
In an article on the topic, Professor Cass Sunstein suggested the 
unconstitutional conditions doctrine is unhelpful because it removes the focus 
from the right questions and distracts attention from whether the 
government is inappropriately infringing on protected constitutional rights 
(even if indirectly).188   If that is the focus, the federal court’s approach is 
correct: the determining question is whether the government is 
impermissibly trying to infringe on protected rights, or indeed is infringing 
on them—and for school immunization, extensive jurisprudence shows that 
is not the case: There is no protected right to send a child to school without 
vaccinating the child.189  
In this Article, however, I believe it is important to also address the 
unconstitutional conditions claim on its merits.  In my view, it is a creative 
and smart legal argument, but in this context, it does not work well for three 
reasons.  First, the doctrine is nowhere as clear-cut as the plaintiffs assert; 
second, under the most common modes of analysis the plaintiffs fail its 
application; and third, the specific rights claims do not hold well in this case.  
The starting point is that the jurisprudence about unconstitutional 
conditions is extremely conflicting and unclear.  To give two examples, in 
1991, the Supreme Court found that it was constitutional for Congress to 
restrict funding to programs that counseled on family planning when those 
programs also offered counseling on abortion.  The Court upheld the 
condition even though it potentially implicated the doctor’s right to free 
speech, and less directly, a woman’s right to abortion.190  In contrast, the 
Supreme Court struck down a California Coastal Commission plan to offer 
coastal owners benefits for allowing the public to use their waterfront.191  
 
 
 
 
 187 See id. at 6–7 (rejecting the plaintiffs’ arguments under each theory in turn).  
 188 Cass R. Sunstein, Is There an Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine?, 26 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 337, 339–
41 (1989) (arguing that, by focusing more on the differences between certain rights, we can more 
readily explain why some governmental actions are constitutional and others are not). 
 189 See Phillips v. City of New York, 775 F.3d 538, 542–43 (2nd Cir. 2015) (rejecting a substantive due 
process argument for the right to not vaccinate one’s child).  
 190 Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 178, 192, 196 (1991). 
 191 Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987). 
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An article examining constitutional conditions explained: 
Despite early judicial assertions that such offers are, on the one hand, always 
permissible or, on the other, always unconstitutional, it is now universally 
recognized that such conditional offers are sometimes constitutionally 
permissible and sometimes not.  Indeed, correctly understood, that is all the 
famed and contentious unconstitutional conditions doctrine holds.  The 
persistent challenge, consequently, has been to articulate some coherent or 
at least intelligible principles or tests by which to determine which offers fall 
into which category-to explicate, in other words, a theory to support the 
doctrine.  Regrettably, more than a century of judicial and scholarly 
attention to the problem has produced few settled understandings.192  
In other words, the doctrine means that sometimes conditions are 
unconstitutional and sometimes they are not—and there is no guiding 
principle to know which is which.  There have certainly been efforts to 
impose guiding principles on the doctrine, but there is no clear 
jurisprudential acceptance of any of them.193  
The lack of clear guidance as to its application does not make the doctrine 
illegitimate; it does make it unclear.  When an ill-defined, unclear in scope 
doctrine like this runs against a consistent line of cases upholding school 
immunization mandates, the argument is not very strong.  
In the same article, Mitchell Berman examines one possible analysis the 
Supreme Court used to analyze constitutional conditions; that analysis 
focuses on the relation between the condition and the benefit.194  In his 
discussion, Berman points out that the Court’s application of the relationship 
was itself inconsistent.195  In one case,  Nollan, the Court focused on whether 
there was a link between the condition and the purpose—whether an 
unrelated condition was only added to coerce, with no direct link to the 
legitimate government action—and an (misapplied, in Berman’s view) 
inquiry into whether the purpose of the condition is connected to denying 
 
 192 Mitchell N. Berman, Coercion Without Baselines: Unconstitutional Conditions in Three Dimensions, 90 GEO. 
L.J. 1, 3 (2001) (footnotes omitted); see also Adam B. Cox & Adam M. Samaha, Unconstitutional 
Conditions Questions Everywhere: The Implications of Exit and Sorting for Constitutional Law and Theory, 5 J. 
LEGAL ANALYSIS 61, 67 (2013) (“But an amusing aspect of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine 
is that there is no doctrine. At least there is no snappy and established test for analyzing 
unconstitutional conditions questions.”).  
 193 See generally Berman, supra note 192; Brian T. Hodges, Are Critical Area Buffers Unconstitutional? 
Demystifying the Doctrine of Unconstitutional Conditions,  8 SEATTLE J. ENVTL. L. 1, 25–29 (2018).  
 194 Berman, supra note 192, at 90–93 (contrasting the central inquiry and conceptual treatment of 
germaneness doctrine in Nollan and Dole, and criticizing the Court’s use of germaneness as a 
“heuristic device” lacking in jurisprudential rigor). 
 195  Id. at 90–91 (noting the analytical similarities between Nollan and Dole, but arguing that each case 
posed distinct questions diverging in treatment of the germaneness inquiry). 
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the benefit.196  In Dole, the Court looked at whether the condition was related 
to the purpose of granting the benefit.197  But with vaccines both inquiries 
lead to the same place.  Using the Nollan inquiry, the focus is on whether the 
denial of school attendance fits the purpose of the act.  In that case,  the goal 
of SB277 is achieving total immunization, with the purpose of making 
schools safer from the diseases in question; making schools safer from disease 
is a legitimate state interest, and requiring vaccines is very, very germane to 
the state interest, and in fact, it is the heart of achieving it.  So, under this 
approach, the plaintiffs would fail.  Using the Dole inquiry, if the benefit is 
school attendance, still a large purpose of SB277 is allowing students to safely 
attend school, and the condition fits it.  
Berman suggests his own more coherent solution—he suggests seeing 
conditions as presumably unconstitutional if they involve coercion—and he 
defines coercion as a situation in which doing the threatened act would be 
unconstitutional,198 for example, if a benefit is withheld for unconstitutional 
purposes.199  But, as already addressed in the previous sections, school 
immunization mandates are constitutional, even through a prism of the right 
to education.  Under this approach, too, the plaintiffs would fail.  
Another, more recent attempt by Elhauge to offer a coherent approach 
to the problem would also not help SB277 opponents.200  This article suggests 
a distinction between contrived and uncontrived threats.  Under this 
standard, school mandates would also not be unconstitutional—because “the 
government has a power to order the relevant action because the individual 
or state has no constitutional right against such compulsion.  Whenever 
direct coercion is permissible, that fact moots the issue of when threats of 
otherwise-lawful action should be deemed coercive, because they would be 
permissible either way.”201  As explained, the jurisprudence supports 
requiring that children be vaccinated.   
 
 196   Id. at 90 (explaining the condition in Dole could not stand because it was not germane to the 
legitimate purposes for which the agency could deny the benefit). 
 197 Id. at 91 (internal citations omitted) (breaking down Chief Justice Rehnquist’s inquiry into discrete 
questions that “compared the government’s purpose for imposing the condition with its purpose 
for granting the benefit”). 
 198 Id. at 16–18 (stating a normative definition for coercion and applying it within the context of 
constitutional violations).  
 199 Id. at 19 (noting that even where the Constitution does not require a state to give a benefit, a state may 
act unconstitutionally if it offers that benefit and withholds it based on an unconstitutional purpose).  
 200 Einer Elhauge, Contrived Threats versus Uncontrived Warnings: A General Solution to the Puzzles of Contractual 
Duress, Unconstitutional Conditions, and Blackmail, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 503, 505–06 (2016) (summarizing 
the doctrinal problems posed by the unconstitutionality of coercion and offering a coherent theory). 
 201 Id. at 506. 
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Further, the rights allegedly violated by the condition do not withstand 
closer scrutiny.   One claim is that the right in tension with attending schools 
is the right of the plaintiff minor children—mostly five to seven-year-olds, 
one nine-year-old, one eleven-year-old—to bodily autonomy and to refuse 
medical treatments.202  The right to bodily autonomy is a very important 
right in our system and has been for a long time.203  But it does not apply in 
the same way to children.204  The five, six, or seven-year-old plaintiffs in 
Torrey-Love did not make the decision to not vaccinate and not protect 
themselves from diseases like diphtheria, hib, polio, and measles themselves.   
Even the nine and eleven-year-old plaintiffs did not make a unilateral 
decision.  It is the parent making the choice here.  Talking about a child’s 
bodily autonomy in this context is simply wrong.  Would these parents let the 
child decide about other treatments, including alternative treatments they 
think their children should get?  Would these parents allow a child that wants 
to be vaccinated to get the vaccine?  There is little debate that children at 
that age do not make their own medical decisions, and the issue is not their 
bodily autonomy.  
Another right mentioned is the right of privacy, a right the Torrey-Love 
lawsuit correctly described as broader in California than the federal right to 
privacy.205  Plaintiffs correctly point out that this right has also been applied 
to minors in some contexts,206 and, as they quote, it applies in matters 
concerning “the preservation of . . . personal health” and matters involving 
“retaining personal control over the integrity of [one’s] own body.”207  
 
 202  See, e.g., Torrey Love Complaint, supra note 65, at 11 (arguing that the California vaccination mandate 
and disclosure of exemption violate the right to bodily autonomy under the state and federal 
constitutions). 
 203 The right to bodily autonomy was acknowledged at least since Schloendorff v. Soc’y of N.Y. Hosp., 
105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914) (“Every human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to 
determine what shall be done with his own body . . . .”).  
 204 Reiss & Weithorn, supra note 21, at 904–05 (noting that the Court has recognized that the 
government has greater authority to “regulate the lives of children”).  
 205 Plaintiffs’ Opposition to Defendants’ Demurrer to Plaintiff’s Complaint; Memorandum of Points 
and Authorities in Support Thereof at 4, Torrey Love v. Cal. Dep’t of Educ., No. SCV0039311, 
(Cal. Super. Ct. June 7, 2017) [hereinafter Torrey-Love Opposition to Demurrer] (basing its 
argument on Williams v. Superior Court, 236 Cal. App. 4th 1151 (Cal. Ct. App. 2015).  Though, 
as will be discussed, the California Supreme Court overturned the decision. Williams v. Superior 
Court, 398 P. 3d 69, 86–88 (Cal. 2017). 
 206 Am. Acad. of Pediatrics v. Lungren, 940 P.2d 797, 813–14 (Cal. 1997) (finding that a statute that 
restricts a pregnant minor’s ability to decide on an abortion implicates a “constitutionally protected 
privacy interest.”). 
 207 Torrey-Love Opposition to Demurrer, supra note 205, at 4 (citing Lungren, 940 P.2d at 813).  On 
medical matters, see also Pettus v. Cole, 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d 46, 72 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996) (finding that 
a patient has a “legally cognizable interest in maintaining the privacy of [their] detailed medical 
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From that, plaintiffs concluded that “Section 120325 is unconstitutional 
because it requires a child to reveal intimate medical history details before 
attending school.”208  This conclusion, however, is both extreme and 
unsupported by the jurisprudence.  The disclosure in question is providing 
school officials with a child’s immunization record or medical exemption.   
Under plaintiffs’ approach, a child—or more accurately, the child’s 
parents—will not have to alert the school to any medical problems the child 
has, even ones that may put the child or others at risk during school hours.  
Schools are responsible for a child’s welfare during hours—and that comes 
with a need to know certain medical facts about the child, making applying 
a strong right of privacy against the school inappropriate.  In relation to 
vaccines, and if taken to its logical conclusion, the claim does not only require 
the return of the exemption—it requires striking down the pre-SB277 law.  
The previous law required that parents provide the child’s immunization 
records or an exemption form.209  A personal belief exemption form would 
violate the child’s privacy in the same way that a medical exemption does, 
by at least letting the school know that the child is unvaccinated.  If the 
concern is a stigma attached to the child, that would also be covered.  Such 
a conclusion would prevent, for example, keeping unvaccinated children out 
during outbreak, putting them and the public health at risk.  It could also 
cause a more direct risk to the child if she were, for example, exposed to 
tetanus on the school grounds and those treating her did not know she is 
unprotected against it. 
Such a conclusion is also not required by California’s jurisprudence.  The 
standard in question has been set by the California Supreme Court in Hill v. 
National College Athletic Association and was recently reaffirmed in Lewis v. 
Superior Court.210  Lewis v. Superior Court provides a summary of California’s 
standard for privacy violations:  
[T]he complaining party must meet three “‘threshold elements’ . . . utilized 
to screen out claims that do not involve a significant intrusion on a privacy 
interest protected by the state constitutional privacy provision.”  The party 
must demonstrate “(1) a legally protected privacy interest; (2) a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the circumstances; and (3) conduct by defendant 
 
information” given to a doctor).   
 208 Torrey-Love Opposition to Demurrer, supra note 205, at 5.  
 209  CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 120365 (West 2015) (providing an exemption for submitting 
immunizations forms where the parents has filed a letter or affidavit affirming that immunizations 
are contrary to their beliefs). 
 210 Hill v. Nat’l Coll. Athletic Ass’n, 865 P.2d 633, 657 (Cal. 1994) (defining a conjunctive test for 
invasions of privacy based on the Privacy Initiative of the California Constitution); Lewis v. 
Superior Court, 397 P.3d 1011, 1018 (Cal. 2017) (outlining the required elements for proving an 
unconstitutional invasion of privacy based on the Hill test). 
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constituting a serious invasion of privacy.”  This initial inquiry is necessary 
to “permit courts to weed out claims that involve so insignificant or de 
minimis an intrusion on a constitutionally protected privacy interest as not 
even to require an explanation or justification by the defendant.”  
Second, if a claimant satisfies the threshold inquiry, “[a] defendant may 
prevail in a state constitutional privacy case by negating any of the three 
elements just discussed or by pleading and proving, as an affirmative defense, 
that the invasion of privacy is justified because it substantively furthers one 
or more countervailing interests.”  “The plaintiff, in turn, may rebut a 
defendant’s assertion of countervailing interests by showing there are feasible 
and effective alternatives to defendant’s conduct which have a lesser impact 
on privacy interests.”211  
It is very clear that the right to privacy of medical records is not 
absolute.212  Here, there is no good reason to claim that a child in school has 
a reasonable expectation of privacy in the circumstances against the school 
authorities—who are entrusted with the child’s wellbeing and need to be 
privy to medical information allowing them to take care of it.  We are not 
discussing broadcasting a child’s medical information to the public.  And the 
fact that California has had a school immunization law that required filing 
medical and personal belief exemptions for decades also goes against the view 
that a child has a reasonable expectation of privacy in this context.  
A person seeking to prevent disclosure of immunization preferences may 
have a lesser privacy interest against disclosure.  Lewis, citing Hill, stated that:  
The standard that a defendant’s proffered countervailing interests must 
satisfy varies based on the privacy interest asserted:  “Where the case involves 
an obvious invasion of an interest fundamental to personal autonomy, e.g., 
freedom from involuntary sterilization or the freedom to pursue consensual 
familial relationships, a ‘compelling interest’ must be present to overcome 
the vital privacy interest.  If in contrast, the privacy interest is less central, or 
in bona fide dispute, general balancing tests are employed.” “The existence 
of a sufficient countervailing interest or an alternative course of conduct 
present[s] threshold questions of law for the court. The relative strength of 
countervailing interests and the feasibility of alternatives present mixed 
questions of law and fact. . . .  [I]n cases where material facts are undisputed, 
 
 211 Lewis, 397 P.3d at 1018 (internal citations omitted) (quoting Loder v. City of Glendale, 927 P.2d 
1200 (Cal. 1997); then quoting Hill, 865 P.2d 633; then quoting Loder, 927 P.2d 1200; and then 
quoting Hill, 865 P.2d 633) (stating the legal standard for establishing and defending privacy 
violations based on the Hill standard).  The plaintiffs in Torrey-Love cited another case that used the 
first part of the Hill test.  Torrey-Love Opposition to Demurrer, supra note 205,  at 5 (citing Willard 
v. AT&T Commc’ns of Cal., Inc., 138 Cal. Rptr. 3d 636, 643 (Cal. Ct. App. 2012)).  However, 
Lewis provides more recent and authoritative guidance on the standard. 
 212 See People v. Martinez, 88 Cal. App. 4th 465, 474–75 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001) (“Defendant’s reasonable 
expectation of privacy in his medical/psychological records must be evaluated in light of his 
criminal background, his status as a prisoner, and the provisions of the SVPA.”). 
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adjudication as a matter of law may be appropriate.”213  
Here, there is an argument that the interest is not fundamental to 
personal autonomy: even if education is a fundamental interest, it is not 
directly about autonomy.  The only case in which a compelling interest was 
required was in Lungren, where the question was a minor’s direct access to 
abortion.214  Attending school is important, but does not have the same 
implication for bodily autonomy that deciding whether to have an abortion 
does.  The question is not whether parental consent is required to agree to a 
vaccine.  The question, simply, is whether informing the school about a 
child’s medical exemption or lack thereof violates a right to privacy.  The 
same autonomy interest is not involved; the claim the plaintiffs make is that 
this will impose stigma on the child.215  This claim fits more clearly into cases 
that were handled under a balancing test.216  
If that’s the case, all that is needed is a balance between the state’s interest 
in preventing diseases that can kill and maim and the limited invasion of 
privacy that providing school authorities with a child’s immunization status 
or medical exemption presents.  Even if we applied the compelling interest 
test, that test is met by the need to prevent disease.  But it is unlikely that 
requirement applies here.   
Finally, the plaintiffs claim SB277 conditions education on their use of 
their right as parents to make medical decisions for their children.217  This is 
probably the strongest argument, but as addressed in Section II.B.1 below, it 
is not convincing in this context, because parental rights are not absolute—
and the jurisprudence has allowed states to limit it in the vaccination context.  
Again, as Prince v. Massachusetts stated, parental rights (or religious freedom) 
do not “include liberty to expose the community or the child to 
communicable disease or the latter to ill health or death.”218  
 
 213  Lewis, 397 P.3d at 1018 (alterations in original) (internal citations omitted) (quoting Hill, 865 P.2d 
at 653, 657). 
 214 Am. Acad. of Pediatrics v. Lungren, 940 P.2d 797, 818–19 (Cal. 1997) (finding that where the 
statute infringes on a fundamental interest in personal autonomy of pregnant minors, the Court 
must apply a more stringent “compelling interest” standard to justify the intrusion).  
 215  Torrey Love Complaint, supra note 65, at 12 (stating that families will face stigma for disclosing 
“confidential medical decisions”). 
 216 For example, in Loder v. City of Glendale, an employer’s drug testing of an employee could violate 
constitutional privacy rights, but whether it did or did not depends on reasonableness in the 
circumstances.  927 P.2d 1200, 1221 (Cal. 1997).  
 217  Torrey Love Complaint, supra note 65, at 12 (arguing that SB227 infringes on the parents’ right to 
make medical decisions for their children). 
 218 321 U.S. 158, 166–167 (1944) (citation omitted) (citing People v. Pierson, 68 N.E. 243 (N.Y. 1903).  
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B.  Claims Contradicted Directly by the School Mandates Jurisprudence 
The next set of claims is less strong, in my view, because it is addressed 
by extensive and well-founded jurisprudence that is unlikely to be completely 
overturned.  
1.  Parental Rights 
Each of the complaints claimed that SB277 violates parental rights.  The 
argument is that by forcing parents to choose between vaccinating and 
sending a child to private or public school (or daycare), the law coerces 
parents to vaccinate, and violates their right to make decisions.  In Whitlow, 
the lawyers made an effort to find litigants they could present as having a real 
problem with keeping their children out of school.  One plaintiff was a single 
mother.  In Torrey-Love, too, the complaint emphasized that the plaintiffs had 
to forgo “much-needed income” to homeschool.219   
Parental rights are very, very important in our system—but they have 
never been absolute.220  And for over a century, consistent jurisprudence 
upheld school immunization mandates in spite of the important status of 
parental rights in our system.221  The rationale, as Professor Weithorn and I 
previously discussed, is that school immunization mandates protect two sets 
of important interests:  a child’s interest in being protected from disease, and 
the state’s public health interest in preventing an outbreak.222  In a real sense, 
the parental rights argument is very problematic in this context.  The risks of 
vaccinating, for every child but the few with medical contraindications—
children who are not required to vaccinate under SB277—are much smaller 
than the risks of not vaccinating (which puts the child at physical risk).223  This 
is a long-standing reason to act and limit parental rights.  Furthermore, 
sending an unvaccinated child to school also affects other families and their 
children, and the argument that one’s parental rights justify putting other 
children at risk is even weaker.  
 
 219 Torrey Love Complaint, supra note 65, at 3–4 (arguing that SB227 infringes on the parents right to 
make medical decisions for their children).  
 220 See Dorit Rubinstein Reiss, Rights of the Unvaccinated Child, 73 STUD. L., POLS., & SOC’Y, 73, 79–80 
(2017); Reiss & Weithorn, supra note 21, at 909–10 (footnotes omitted) (noting that states usually 
defer to parents on decisions regarding their children, but “parental discretion is not unlimited . . . 
where the benefits to the child are uncertain or outweighed by risks.”). 
 221 Reiss & Weithorn, supra note 21, at 913 n.132 (footnotes omitted) (pointing to Supreme Court 
precedent authorizing states to require parents to vaccinate their children).  
 222 Id. at 914 (comparing vaccination requirements to other compulsory rules regulating children, and 
arguing that vaccination mandates serve both immediate and long-term needs).   
 223 Supra Part I.  
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Initially, I was of the view that there is also an argument that SB277 does 
not force parents to vaccinate, because of the existence of alternatives, such 
as homeschooling.224   I have somewhat retreated from that position, though. 
For some parents, circumstances may make homeschooling untenable or 
require them to choose between earning a living wage and homeschooling. 
It is certainly problematic to claim there is no coercion in those 
circumstances, as the plaintiffs point out.  
I maintain, however, that there are degrees of coercion, and that the level 
of coercion in SB277 is less than in other contexts.  It is important to 
remember that there is jurisprudence supporting direct coercion of parents 
who refuse medical treatment in circumstances that put children at risk, even 
if the risk there was more visible and imminent than in this context.225  In 
Philadelphia in 1991, during a measles outbreak that killed nine children, a 
judge ordered vaccination of children in recalcitrant religious communities 
over parental objection.226  In some cases in the 1950s–1960s, parents were 
criminally charged and sometimes convicted of non-vaccination and 
truancy.227  SB277 does not go that far.  
School immunization mandates certainly burden choice substantially but 
are less coercive than direct force or criminalization accompanied by the 
threat of incarceration, for example.228   In this way, it is a less coercive tool 
from the state’s arsenal of tools to promote vaccination, though still a real 
and potentially serious imposition.  In a recent book, Linda Fentiman 
compares the relatively gentle treatment non-vaccinating mothers are 
subjected to the much harsher, more coercive treatment meted out to poor 
mothers who put their children at risk in various ways, for example, by drug 
 
 224 See Won, supra note 73, at 494–95 (explaining the existence of free homeschooling and independent 
study options).  
 225 Reiss, supra, note 220, at 91–95.  
 226 PAUL A. OFFIT, BAD FAITH: WHEN RELIGIOUS BELIEF UNDERMINES MODERN MEDICINE 66–
80 (2015) (providing an example of courts intervening with child welfare when parents with strong 
religious beliefs refuse their children medical treatment). 
 227 Efthimios Parasidis & Douglas J. Opel, Parental Refusal of Childhood Vaccines and Medical Neglect Laws, 
107 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 68, 69–70 (2017) (illustrating the court frequently finding parents guilty 
of child neglect for failing to immunize their children); Reiss, supra note 219, at 89. 
 228 See Reiss & Weithorn, supra note 21 at 960–62 (“A mandate, as discussed here, burdens choice fairly 
heavily, while not eliminating it completely. It requires that persons engage in affirmative 
conduct—in this case, vaccination of children—accompanied by a threat of deleterious 
consequences for noncompliance. . . .  We place school-entry vaccination requirements in this 
category, recognizing the centrality of elementary and secondary school attendance as a cherished 
opportunity in American society. Removal of that opportunity introduces an exceptional and 
perhaps unequalled deprivation into the lives of those prevented from attending.”)  
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use during pregnancy.229  She, too, highlights the less coercive treatment 
these mothers—mostly white and middle class—receive.230  
When it comes to sending unvaccinated children to school, the argument 
for a parental right to send the child to school unvaccinated runs into two 
other important sets of rights, the right of the child to health, and the right of 
other families for a safe school environment.231  The state could have chosen 
to criminalize non-vaccinating—as it criminalized other decisions that put 
children at risk—and may have been more justified here, because of the effect 
on others (a counter to that argument is that in areas with high vaccine rates, 
herd immunity makes the risk less imminent; state legislation, however, is 
hard to target that finely).  SB277 is a less coercive option than what the state 
could have chosen, and parental rights are not a barrier to it.  
2.  Equal Protection 
An equal protection claim was raised in the lawsuits in two versions.   One 
is extreme and one more is nuanced, but both face similar problems.  In the 
extreme version, the Buck plaintiffs stated that: 
SB277 will segregate children based on whether they are vaccinated or 
unvaccinated, and this constitutes discrimination based on “vaccination 
status.”  Under a Brown  v. Board of Education analysis, such a bifurcated school 
system—vaccinate [sic] and unvaccinated—reeks of separate-but-equal and 
thus, cannot stand.  Under California law, segregation based on vaccination 
status is every bit as odious as segregation based on race, creed or color.232  
In the most nuanced version, the Whitlow plaintiffs stated that:  
SB 277 violates equal protection by denying some children their 
fundamental  right to an education, while preserving the right for others.  
SB 277 treats healthy  children with PBEs differently from all other 
California children by denying them an education.  SB 277 violates equal 
protection by excluding children with PBEs who have reached 
“checkpoints,” treating them differently than other children with PBEs.  
There is no legitimate reason to differentiate a seventh grader from a sixth 
grader or an eighth grader.  SB 277 does this for administrative ease, not 
any legitimate, let alone compelling, state interest.   
Further, SB 277 violates the equal protection rights of special education 
students.  First, as written, SB 277 exempts special education students with 
IEPs pursuant to IDEA who are entitled to FAPE under federal law but does 
 
 229 LINDA FENTIMAN, BLAMING MOTHERS: AMERICAN LAW AND THE RISKS TO CHILDREN’S 
HEALTH  247, 273–74 (2017) (comparing the different treatment of mother’s who do not vaccinate 
their children with mother’s who engage in other behavior society deems neglectful). 
 230 Id. at 273–74 (indicating racial disparities). 
 231 Won, supra note 143, at 479, 484.  
 232 Buck Complaint, supra note 87, at 3. 
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not exempt students with 504 plans pursuant to the Rehabilitation Act of 
1973. . . .233 
In both cases, the problem plaintiffs face is that they are incorrect in 
claiming discrimination, and less correct in claiming illegal discrimination.  
Discrimination happens when like cases are treated differently—different 
treatment of different cases does not violate equal protection.234  But 
vaccinated and unvaccinated children are not alike. This is true whether the 
child is missing one vaccine or is completely unvaccinated.  Modern vaccines 
are not perfect, but they are highly effective: the vaccines required for school 
attendance usually range in effectiveness from seventy to ninety-seven 
percent.235  As a result, children who get these vaccines are much less likely 
to get the diseases than their unprotected, unvaccinated peers.  Studies 
repeatedly and consistently show higher rates of preventable diseases among 
the unvaccinated.236  
Sending a completely or partially unvaccinated child to school creates a 
preventable risk that the child will infect other children, for example, children 
who cannot be vaccinated, young siblings of classmates – too young to be 
fully vaccinated - or the rare few that suffer vaccine failure.  At least two 
measles outbreaks in the United States, for example, started when 
 
 233 Memorandum of Points & Auths. in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 
*23, Whitlow v. California, 203 F. Supp. 3d 1079 (C.D. Cal 2016) (No. 3:16-CV-01715-DMS-
GBS).  
 234 Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 10 (1992); see also Erwin Chemerinsky, In Defense of Equality: A Reply 
to Professor Westen, 81 MICH. L. REV 575, 590–91 (1983).  
 235 See Aruna Chandran, James P. Watt & Mathuram Santosham, Haemophilus Influenzae Vaccines, 
VACCINES 167, 175–176 (Stanley A. Plotkin, Walter Orenstein & Paul A. Offit eds., 2013); see also 
Haemophilus Influenza Type B, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,  
http://www.cdc.gov/vaccines/pubs/pinkbook/downloads/hib.pdf (finding that the vaccine 
against Hib consistently shows to protect over 90% of children who complete the series); Emmanuel 
Vidor, Stanley A. Plotkin, Poliovirus Vaccine—Inactivated Vaccines 573, 587–588 (Stanley A. Plotkin, 
Walter Orenstein and Paul A. Offit eds. 2013) (noting the high efficacy rates of various polio 
vaccines): Poliomyelitis, in VACCINES 167, 175–176 (Stanley A. Plotkin, Walter Orenstein & Paul A. 
Offit eds., 2013); see also Haemophilus Influenza Type B, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & 
PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/vaccines/pubs/pinkbook/downloads/polio.pdf (showing 
that the inactivated vaccine against polio consistently shows over eighty percent effectiveness and 
in some studies, over ninety-five percent effectiveness in preventing paralytic polio); see also Reiss, 
supra note 18, at 9–10 (illustrating similar statistics indicating vaccines reducing various diseases). 
 236 Most recently, a review showed that a relationship between vaccination and contracting measles 
and pertussis. Varun K. Phadke et al., Association Between Vaccine Refusal and Vaccine-Preventable Diseases 
in the United States: A Review of Measles and Pertussis, 315 [J]AMA 1149, 1158 (2016); Invasive Haemophilus 
Influenzae Type B Disease in Very Young Children—Minnesota, 2008, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & 
PREVENTION: MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. (Jan. 30 2009), 
https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/mm5803a4.htm; Jason M. Glanz, et al., 
Parental Refusal of Pertussis Vaccination Is Associated With an Increased Risk of Pertussis Infection in Children, 
123 PEDIATRICS 1446, 1449–50 (2009).  
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unvaccinated children traveled to Europe, contracted measles there, and 
brought it back.237  While a vaccinated child can also be among the small 
percent for whom the vaccine fails, and may also catch and transmit the 
disease, that situation is much less likely and unpreventable.  It is the 
difference between an accident caused because someone made a conscious 
decision not to maintain her brakes, and an accident caused because of an 
unpreventable and rare mechanical brake failure.  We treat the cases 
differently because the first is the result of a choice not to prevent a risk, and 
the second is the result of pure bad luck, with no real precaution available to 
reduce the risk.  It is a meaningful difference.  
Not only can unvaccinated children themselves contract and transmit a 
disease, but a concentration of such children undermines herd immunity.  
This puts the community at increased risk of outbreaks.238  In fact, there is 
evidence that a child is safer from preventable disease if she’s unvaccinated 
in a community with high vaccination rates than if she is vaccinated in a 
community with low rates.239  In this sense, too, unvaccinated children are 
meaningfully different than vaccinated ones.  By congregating, they can 
create a risk of an outbreak in a community, putting everyone at risk.  
Since the cases of vaccinated and unvaccinated children are not alike, it 
is not discrimination to treat them differently.  
Furthermore, there is a big difference between status-based distinctions 
and those relying on choice.  Our system treats historically vulnerable groups 
differently than it treats other classifications, and certainly those based on risk-
causing behavior.  Children whose parents chose not to vaccinate are very, 
very different from children from minority groups based on ethnicity or 
religion.  If a parent sent the unvaccinated child to school in violation of 
SB277, the child would be denied access, and that is not discrimination.  It is 
 
 237 Parker et al., supra note 74, at 447 (illustrating that disease epidemics occurring in the United States 
often are a result of a non-vaccinated individual traveling abroad and bringing the disease back 
into the United States); Sugerman, supra note 74, at 747 (providing another example of an individual 
traveling abroad and bringing into the United States a seemingly eradicated virus).  
 238 See Bradford & Mandich, supra note 7, at 1383 (finding that more effective state immunization 
policies increase overall immunity to diseases within the community); P Gahr et al., An Outbreak of 
Measles in an Undervaccinated Community, 134 PEDIATRICS 3220, 3220 (2014) (outlining the possibility 
that once eradicated diseases could become epidemics should widespread immunization not be 
maintained); Omer et al., supra note 26, at 1389 (illustrating the increased prevalence of disease in 
communities with larger numbers of children who have not been vaccinated); Omer et al., supra 
note 25, at 1757 (illustrating the increased prevalence of disease in communities with larger 
numbers of children who have not been vaccinated).  
 239 S. von den Hof et al., Measles Epidemic in the Netherlands: 1999–2000, 186 J. INFECTIOUS DISEASES 
1483, 1485 (2002) (illustrating the principle of herd immunity). 
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a consequence imposed as a result of the parent’s choice not to protect the child 
from disease—for the protection of the child and others.  It is not 
discrimination because it is based on behavior.  As I have explained elsewhere: 
Behavior that imposes risks on others can and should be regulated. For 
example, the state can and does regulate one’s ability to drink and drive; 
while you are free to drink, the state can penalize you if you drive while 
under the influence, because that behavior creates a risk. . . . 
In this context, parents who choose not to vaccinate are more like those 
who choose to drink and drive than . . . members of an ethnic group.  They 
have no more claim of discrimination than does the Association Against 
Discriminating on the Basis of Alcohol Consumption (ADOBAC).240 
Judge Sabraw, in Whitlow, addressed this issue thus: 
Here, none of the disputed classifications supports an equal protection 
claim.  First, children with PBEs are not similarly situated to children without 
PBEs.  Nor are children at “checkpoints” similarly situated to children not 
at “checkpoints.”  And the  same may be said of children with IEPs versus 
those without.  In each of those  categories, the children are not similarly 
situated, which dooms Plaintiffs’ equal  protection claim.   
Moreover, even if these children were similarly situated, these 
classifications would not violate the equal protection clause.  Plaintiffs have 
failed to show that children with PBEs, children at “checkpoints,” and 
section 504 children are members of a suspect class.  Plaintiffs have also 
failed to show that these classifications burden a fundamental right.  Thus, 
these classifications would be subject to rational basis review, not strict 
scrutiny.241   
And, explains the judge, all the classifications have a rational basis behind 
them.242 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 240 Reiss supra note 147, at 107 (footnotes omitted).  ADOBAC is a fictional association.  
 241 Whitlow v. California, 203 F. Supp. 3d 1079,. 1087 (S.D. Cal. 2016) (footnotes omitted) (first citing 
City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 442 (1985); then citing San Antonio Indep. 
Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 (1973)).  
 242 Id. at 1087–88.  
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3.  Substantive Due Process 
All the lawsuits raised a claim of substantive due process.  This claim is 
tied to the claim of violation of parental liberties, which have long since been 
considered part of the liberty interest protected under the Fourteenth 
Amendment.243  However, such rights, as discussed, are not absolute, and in 
the context of vaccines, the jurisprudence has long rejected due process 
challenges to school mandates as far back as Zucht.244  Most recently, both 
Phillips245 and Workman246 rejected an identical claim.  And in Whitlow, citing 
these cases, Judge Sabraw found that the due process claim is foreclosed by 
Zucht, and also rejected the claim.247 
An extensive jurisprudence rejects the argument that substantive due 
process is violated when a parent is denied the possibility of sending an 
unvaccinated child to school, something that risks both the child and others.  
C.  Implausible Claims 
Two very implausible claims were raised in the lawsuits.  I discuss them 
here—in spite of their obvious weaknesses—for two purposes.  First, as 
legally unconvincing as they are, they have been aggressively raised in the 
SB277 discussions, and may well be raised in other states during legislative 
debates: it may therefore be useful to arm policy makers, public activists and 
courts with ready explanation of the problems.  Second, I think the claims 
shed important light on the frame of mind of the most extreme of opponents 
to mandates.  
1.  Liability Protections and Unavoidably Unsafe 
The Buck lawsuit claimed, and Whitlow suggested, that the liability 
protections manufacturers enjoy are a reason to reject mandates since they 
imply that vaccines carry risks.248  
 
 
 
 243 See, e.g., Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 63–66 (2000); Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 
533–35 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399–400 (1923). 
 244 Zucht v. King, 260 U.S. 174, 176–77 (1922). 
 245 Phillips v. City of New York, 775 F.3d 538, 542–43 (2d Cir. 2015). 
 246 Workman v. Mingo Cty. Bd. of Educ., 419 F. App’x 348, 355–56 (4th Cir. 2011).  
 247 Whitlow v. California, 203 F. Supp. 3d 1079, 1089 (S.D. Cal. 2016). 
 248 Buck Complaint, supra note 87, at 10; Complaint for Declaratory, Injunctive, or Other Relief. at 17, 
Whitlow v. California, 203 F. Supp. 3d 1079, 1091 (S.D. Cal. 2016). 
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In part, the claim, as described in Buck, seemed to draw on a 
misunderstanding of the term Unavoidably Unsafe.249  The appellate brief states:  
[A]ll vaccine designs are “unavoidably unsafe” (factually and legally). Under 
federal law, all vaccine designs all legally presumed to come with the risk of 
“Unavoidable adverse side effects.”  In short, all vaccines are “unavoidably 
unsafe” because their designs are presumed to be “unavoidably defective.”  
Plaintiffs’ argument on appeal is simple and straightforward: no state may 
mandate unavoidably unsafe products—i.e., known to cause indiscriminate 
death and permanent disability—without a parent’s right to decline. . . .250  
Buck’s plaintiffs, first and foremost, confuse the unavoidably unsafe 
exception in comment k to the Restatement (Second) of Torts with the idea 
of a defective product.251  Comment k itself explains that the category it 
creates is not “defective”: “such a product, properly prepared, and 
accompanied by proper directives and warnings, is not defective, nor is it 
unreasonably dangerous.”252  In other words, the argument is based on a 
pretty deep misunderstanding of the source of the term it uses.  
Nor is there any justification to see “all” vaccines, as the brief claims, as 
defective.  Vaccines certainly have inherent risks—but every product, even a 
perfectly made one, has risks. The existence of a risk alone does not make a 
product defective, or all knives, all cars, all drugs would be defective going in 
– and they are not: plaintiffs have to show more than a risk to win a product 
liability case.253 
Nothing is one hundred percent safe, but as mentioned, the small risks of 
vaccines are far outweighed by their benefits, and the lives saved.254  
Seatbelts, too, carry risks255—but are mandated because of their substantial 
 
 249  The appellate court addressing this issue stated, very directly, that “Plaintiffs are, of course, quite 
wrong.”  Brown v. Smith, 24 Cal. App. 5th 1135, 1143 (Cal. Ct. App. 2018).   
 250 Appellants’ Opening Brief at 13, Buck v. Smith, No. B279936 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 20, 2016) 
(internal citations omitted) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 300aa–22(b)).  
 251 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, cmt. k (AM. LAW INST. 1965).  
 252 Id.  
 253 JOHN S. ALLEE ET AL., PRODUCT LIABILITY, § 2.46.6-2.5[2] (2012).   
 254 See Maglione supra note 12, at 325. This point was also made by the Court of Appeal.  Brown v. 
Smith, 24 Cal. App. 5th 1135, 1143 (Cal. Ct. App. 2018) (“No doubt injuries and deaths have been 
caused by vaccines, and no doubt there are cases of ‘unavoidable, adverse side effects.’ This does not 
change the pertinent point: as Bruesewitz tells us, ‘the elimination of communicable diseases through 
vaccination became “one of the greatest achievements” of public health in the 20th century.’ But 
‘these gains are fragile’ and ‘[e]ven a brief period when vaccination programs are disrupted can lead 
to children’s deaths.’” (quoting Bruesewitz v. Wyeth LLC, 562 U.S. 223, 230 (2011))).   
 255 See generally Seema Biswas et al., Abdominal Injury Patterns in Patients with Seatbelt Signs Requiring 
Laparotomy, 7(4) J. EMERGENCY, TRAUMA, & SHOCK 295 (2014); William N. Evans & John D. 
Graham, Risk Reduction or Risk Compensation? The Case of Mandatory Safety-Belt use Laws, 4 J. RISK & 
UNCERTAINTY 61 (1991). 
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benefits in saving lives.256  In other words, the mere fact that there is a (small) 
risk attached to vaccines does not prevent the state from mandating them 
when the benefits are larger, just as the states may require a child undergo 
life-saving surgery—even though surgery carries undeniable risks—when the 
risks of no surgery are higher.257 
Nor are liability protections in contrast with a mandate.  To protect the 
vaccine supply, in 1986 Congress passed the National Childhood Vaccine 
Injury Act, which created, among other things, a no-fault program to 
compensate for the potential harms from vaccines.258  The program has 
several goals, among them, and likely most important, to ensure the national 
vaccine supply and keep vaccine prices affordable by protecting 
manufacturers from unpredictable liability259 and to address the 
shortcomings of the tort system with a no-fault forum designed to resolve 
vaccine injury claims “quickly, easily, with certainty and generosity.”260   In 
other words, liability protections for manufacturers in the United States are 
part of a parcel that provides claimants a much easier process than having to 
go through the regular civil courts would.261  The existence of such a forum 
is not an argument against school mandates that make schools safer.  
This claim, therefore, is simply implausible.  
2.  RICO 
The core of one of the lawsuits—Middleton—is a Racketeer Influenced and 
Corrupt Organization (“RICO”) claim.262  That claim, as presented here, is 
extremely weak. The only reason to analyze it is that other states passing 
immunization laws may well face identical claims from litigating non-lawyers.  
Having the explanation why these claims are invalid at hand might be helpful.  
RICO claims against legislatures passing vaccine-related legislation and 
governors signing such legislation simply will not work.  Under our 
 
 256 See generally Christopher S. Carpenter & Mark Stehr, The Effects of Mandatory Seatbelt Laws on Seatbelt 
Use, Motor Vehicle Fatalities, and Crash-Related Injuries Among Young Adults, 27 J. HEALTH ECON. 642 
(2008); Alma Cohen & Liran Einav, The Effects of Mandatory Seat Belt Laws on Driving Behavior and 
Traffic Fatalities, 85 REV. ECON. & STAT. 828 (2003).  
 257 See, e.g., In re Phillip B., 92 Cal. App. 3d 796, 801 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979). 
 258 42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-1–aa-34 (2012). 
 259 Geoffrey Evans et al., Legal Issues, in VACCINES 1481 (Stanley A. Plotkin et al. eds. 2013). 
 260 H.R. REP. NO. 99-908, pt. 1, at 3 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6344, 6344. 
 261 Bruesewitz v. Wyeth, 562 U.S. 223, 227–28 (2011).  The program has its issues, but also substantial 
benefits.  For more discussion of it, see generally ANNA KIRKLAND, VACCINE COURT: THE LAW 
AND POLITICS OF INJURY 6–9 (2016) and Nora Freeman Engstrom, A Dose of Reality for Specialized 
Courts: Lessons from the VICP, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 1631 (2015). 
 262 See 18 U.S.C. § 1961–1968 (1990).   
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jurisprudence, as the court’s decision in Middleton highlighted, legislators are 
absolutely immune from monetary damages suits for legislative activities 
(passing laws is clearly legislative)—including from RICO claims.263   So even 
if the plaintiffs establish the elements of RICO—and they do not—the 
legislators they sued would be immune, for good reason. The goal of the 
doctrine of legislative immunity is to allow legislators to act and speak freely 
when representing their constituents, without fear of intimidation by 
lawsuits.264  Under the Eleventh Amendment the Governor, too, is immune 
from damages suits when he acts in his official capacity.265 
Even if courts ignore immunity, or plaintiffs choose defendants without 
immunity, the RICO claim is not appropriate in this context.  The RICO 
Act266 was originally created to allow the government to capture and deal 
with organized crime, but its use quickly expanded to other contexts.267  The 
act allows for criminal action against certain kinds of activities, but also allows 
for civil suits, with the tempting remedy of treble damages for successful 
plaintiffs.268  The courts have interpreted RICO expansively.269  Plaintiffs, 
however, have gone beyond that expansive interpretation, in ways that 
suggest abuse of the law in a variety of contexts.270 
In this lawsuit, too, RICO appears overused.  The magistrate’s 
recommendation, accepted by the judge, explains part of the reason it is not 
appropriate: 
 
 
 
 263 Middleton v. Pan, No. 2:16-cv-05224-SVW-AGR, 2016 WL 7053936, at *7 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 15, 
2016) (citing Bogan v. Scott-Harris, 523 U.S. 44, 46 (1998) (noting that legislators hold immunity 
from liability)); see also Chappell v. Robbins, 73 F.3d 918, 920, 924 (9th Cir. 1996).  
 264 Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 617 (1972) (holding that the purpose of legislative immunity 
is “to prevent intimidation of legislators by the Executive and accountability before a possibly hostile 
judiciary”).  
 265 Middleton, 2017 WL 7053936, at *7 (noting that the Eleventh Amendment gives the governor 
immunity from civil liability).  
 266 18 U.S.C. § 1961–1968 (1990). 
 267 Paul A. Batista, The Uses and Misuses of Rico in Civil Litigation: A Guide for Plaintiffs and Defendants, 8 DEL. J. 
CORP. L. 181, 181–83 (1983) (“The emerging use of RICO in the context of traditional civil lawsuits 
presents unique opportunities. . . .”); Nicholas L. Nybo, A Three-Ring Circus: The Exploitation of Civil RICO, 
How Treble Damages Caused It, and Whether Rule 11 Can Remedy the Abuse, 18 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 
19, 24–26 (2013) (discussing frivolous claims brought forth by private plaintiffs). 
 268 Lee Coppola & Nicholas DeMarco, Civil RICO: How Ambiguity Allowed the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt 
Organizations Act to Expand Beyond its Intended Purpose, 38 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 
241, 242 (2012) (“In addition to severe criminal penalties, RICO also provides a civil action for treble 
damages where an aggrieved party may recovery for injury to their business or property. . . .”). 
 269 Id. 
 270 Nybo, supra note 267, at 25–27. 
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The court is hard pressed to see any way in which Plaintiffs’ challenge to 
SB 277 could plausibly fall within RICO.  Section 1961 contains only the 
definitions.  In the event Plaintiffs attempt to amend the RICO claims, 
Plaintiffs are advised that they must allege injury to their business or property 
by reason of a violation of § 1962.   The FAC does not contain allegations of 
injury to Plaintiffs’ business or property.    
Section 1962(a) provides that it is unlawful “for any person who has 
received any income derived, directly or indirectly, from a pattern of 
racketeering activity . . . to use or invest . . . any part of such income . . . 
in. . . operation of . . . any enterprise.”  The FAC contains no such 
allegations. Moreover, under §1962(a), Plaintiffs must “allege facts tending 
to show that he or she was injured by the use or investment of racketeering 
income.”  Injury from alleged  racketeering acts that generated the income 
is not sufficient.    
Absent allegations of a viable RICO violation, Plaintiffs’ allegations of a 
conspiracy to violate RICO under § 1962(d) also fail to state a claim.271  
In other words, RICO is not a synonym for “something is wrong, 
someone did something bad.”272  RICO is a specific act that requires meeting 
exacting legal standards.  In this case, plaintiffs did not say which one of the 
enumerated federal crimes in  Section 1961’s definition of “Racketeering 
Activity” defendants are supposed to have violated.  RICO does not cover 
any corrupt conduct or ethically problematic conduct: it addresses a specific 
set of crimes.  Plaintiffs allege corruption and conspiracy, but that is not 
enough.  Their mention of campaign contributions might suggest they think 
there was bribery—but legal campaign contributions are not bribery.  In 
other words, it is unclear what the specific racketeering activity is.  General 
claims of obstruction of justice and oath violation are not enough to form a 
basis for a RICO claim, either.  Civil rights violations alone, even if they did 
occur, are not racketeering activity, either.273 
As the state pointed out in its motion to dismiss, “RICO’s civil remedy 
section ‘requires as a threshold for standing an injury to ‘business or 
property.’’”274  Plaintiffs did not claim an injury to their property, only to their 
liberty, so on this, too, they fail.  It is hard to see any direct injury to property 
from school immunization mandates; they do not focus on property, but on 
 
 271 Report & Recommendation of U.S. Magistrate Judge, supra note 67, at 17–18 (internal citations 
omitted) (citing Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 495–97 (1985); then quoting Nugget 
Hydroelectric, L.P. v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 981 F.2d 429, 437 (9th Cir. 1992)).  
 272 For a humorous and less than politically correct treatment of the issue that is nonetheless 
sophisticated and accurate, see Ken White, Lawsplainer: IT’S NOT RICO, DAMMIT, POPEHAT 
(June 14, 2016), https://www.popehat.com/2016/06/14/lawsplainer-its-not-rico-dammit/.  
 273 Bowen v. Oistead, 125 F.3d 800, 806 (9th Cir. 1997) (noting that civil rights violations are not 
racketeering). 
 274 State’s Motion to Dismiss at 21, Middleton v. Pan, 2017 WL 7053936 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 15, 2016) 
(No. 2:16-cv-05224-SVW-AGR) (quoting Avalos v. Baca, 596 F.3d 583, 592 (9th Cir. 2010)).   
262 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 21:1 
   
 
preventing outbreaks.  A weak argument could be made that being required 
to forego income to homeschool affects property or business, but that is a very 
tenuous connection to the alleged racketeering activity.  
In other words, the RICO claim is unfounded because plaintiffs did not 
even try to meet the requirements of a RICO suit.  Even if they had, passing 
a law that plaintiffs think is the result of special interests’ influence is not 
racketeering activity.  The plaintiffs are attempting to force a scenario that is 
just a bad match to a RICO claim into that mold. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiffs fighting against school immunization mandates must overcome 
two obstacles.  First, they must overcome the strong public policy reasons 
behind mandates—stronger mandates reduce outbreaks,275 prevent deaths, 
suffering, and reduce costs.276 Second, they must overcome the long-standing 
jurisprudence that supports these mandates—exactly because of their 
substantial benefits for children and the community.277  In fighting SB277, 
plaintiffs tried a variety of legal strategies and creative arguments to combat 
the law, but so far courts have consistently rejected the arguments.  This Article 
outlines the claims, analyzes them, and explains why continuing to reject these 
claims is the correct legal conclusion, as well as the correct public policy.  
It is easy to sympathize with parents who are so frightened from vaccines 
that they see being required to vaccinate their children as a condition to 
sending them to school as coercion.  Fear is understandable, even when 
based on misconceptions.  But this sympathy is not a reason to prevent states 
from acting to protect children and the community by passing strong 
immunization laws.  After all, it is important to remember that the children 
left unvaccinated also depend on the community having high vaccination 
rates.  Lacking protection of their own, they are at high risk during an 
outbreak of preventable diseases.  Courts’ unwavering support of school 
immunization protects children in the school, the community, and yes, the 
children whose parents are frightened of vaccinating because of (incorrect) 
anti-vaccine claims.  In this case, law, justice, and sound policy collide. 
 
 275 See Bradford & Mandich, supra note 7, at 1383 (“States that had the most effective portfolio of 
policies had lower incidences of pertussis.”). 
 276 See Moser, supra note 81, at 633 (“By disregarding evidence of the safety and effectiveness of vaccines 
and choosing not to vaccinate their children, some parents are increasing the risk of outbreaks and 
their attendant costs.”); Zhou, supra note 91, at 581 (discussing  the number of projected deaths 
saved and costs averted).  
 277 See, e.g., Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (discussing the ways in which a state can 
restrict parental control). 
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APPENDIX 
Table 1: The Four SB277 Lawsuits278 
Whitlow 
 
Buck Middleton Torrey-Love 
Plaintiffs 
Seventeen 
individual 
plaintiffs and 
four 
organizations, 
including 
partially 
vaccinated & 
some claiming 
vaccine injuries. 
Eight individual 
plaintiffs, very 
strongly anti-
vaccine.  
Over twenty 
pro-se litigants, 
led by a non-
lawyer. 
Seven 
individual 
plaintiffs, three 
parents and 
four minor 
children, and 
the organization 
“A Voice for 
Choice.”  
Venue 
Federal District 
Court, 
Southern 
District of 
California 
State Superior 
Court, Los 
Angeles; 
continued to 
California 
Court of 
Appeals of the 
Second District  
Federal District 
Court, Central 
District of 
California 
First round: 
Federal District 
Court, Central 
District of 
California   
Second round:  
State Superior 
Court, Placer 
County 
  
 
 278 The full name of each lawsuit was included in the text.  See supra Part III.  For ease of use, the first 
plaintiff’s name is used as the title. 
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Whitlow 
 
Buck Middleton Torrey-Love 
Lawyers 
Plaintiff: James 
S. Turner, 
Robert T. 
Moxley, 
Kimberly M. 
Mack 
Rosenberg, 
Carl M. Lewis   
Defendant: 
Jonathan E 
Rich (Office of 
the Attorney 
General) 
 
Plaintiff: T. 
Matthew 
Phillips (T 
Matthew 
Phillips Law 
Offices)  
Defendant: 
Jonathan E 
Rich (Office of 
the Attorney 
General)  
Plaintiff: No 
lawyer, but 
Travis 
Middleton, lead 
plaintiff, is a 
repeat litigant 
and considers 
himself an 
expert. He is 
clearly the 
leading spirit. 
Defendant: 
Cara L. Jenkins 
(Office of 
Legislative 
Counsel)  
Jacquelyn 
Young and 
Jonathan E. 
Rich (Office of 
the Attorney 
General) 
Plaintiff: Brad 
A. Hakala (The 
Hakala Law 
Group PC), 
James Leon 
Moultrie, III 
(Hakala Law 
Group PC), 
Jeffrey B. 
Compangano 
(Hakala Law 
Group PC)  
Defendant: 
Jacquelyn 
Young and 
Jonathan E. 
Rich (Office of 
the Attorney 
General)  
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Whitlow 
 
Buck Middleton Torrey-Love 
Procedural Posture 
On appeal from 
denied 
injunction in 
the U.S. District 
Court for the 
Southern 
District of 
California  
(Plaintiffs 
voluntary 
dismiss their 
claim without 
prejudice Aug. 
31, 2016)  
(Filed in state 
court, removed 
to federal court, 
remanded back 
to state)  
States demurrer 
accepted by 
Superior Court 
Judge.  
Demurrer is 
sustained, 
without leave to 
amend   
Plaintiffs 
appealed, 
parties filed 
briefs on 
appeal. 
It is a bit 
unclear.  The 
initial case was 
dismissed but 
the judge 
accepted, in 
that decision, 
the plaintiffs’ 
second 
amended 
complaint as 
another claim, 
and that 
proceeding is 
not finished.  In 
the meantime, 
the plaintiffs 
filed a Habeas 
motion with the 
Ninth Circuit, 
for reasons not 
quite clear.  
Defendant 
motion to 
dismiss granted, 
Plaintiff motion 
for preliminary 
injunction 
denied.  
A Voice for 
Choice 
appealed the 
dismissal to the 
California 
Court of Appeal 
of the Second 
District.  
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Whitlow 
 
Buck Middleton Torrey-Love 
Main Claims 
Plaintiffs assert 
they are 
challenging the 
elimination of 
the personal 
belief 
exemption; 
claim violation 
of free exercise 
of religion 
under First 
Amendment, 
violation of due 
process, equal 
protection, right 
of education, 29 
U.S.C. § 794 
(no 
discrimination 
under federal 
grants and 
programs)  
Violation of: 1) 
Free Exercise 
Clause, 2) right 
to an education 
under Article 
IX, § 5 of 
California 
constitution,  
3) Equal 
Protection 
Clause,  
4) Health and 
Safety Code 
§ 24175,  
5) Due Process 
Clause  
1) Violation of 
RICO under 18 
U.S.C. §§ 1961, 
1962(a), (d),  
2) conspiracy to 
promote the 
sale and use of 
biological 
weapons on 
California 
citizens 18 
U.S.C. § 175,  
3) conspiracy to 
promote the 
sale and use of 
chemical 
weapons on 
California 
citizens 18 
U.S.C. § 178,  
4) violation of 
18 U.S.C. §§ 
241, 242,  
5) violation of 
42 U.S.C. 
§§ 1983, 1986,  
6) intentional 
infliction of 
emotional 
distress 
Violation of: 1) 
substantive due 
process rights 
under 
Fourteenth 
Amendment,  
2) the Equal 
Protection 
Clause of the 
Fourteenth 
Amendment, 
and 3) 42 
U.S.C. § 1983 
right to refuse 
immunization, 
right to public 
education, 
equal 
protection, 
unconstitutional 
condition  
 
 
